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A Modern Template for Discussion*
Ray Nimmer
There has been radical change in the source of value and focus in
our economy as we have made a transition to an information and ser-
vices economy. As with any fundamental economic change, the tran-
sition to an information economy benefits some, while it weakens the
economic position of others. It predictably produced conflict. Some
of this results from the defensive actions of previously entrenched in-
terests and academic viewpoints. But some involves honest debate
about how law should interact with the new economy. That issue will
be with us for many years. The reality is that intangible assets are at
the center of the economy and licensing transactions related to these
assets are an integral part of modern commercial law and practice.
But they entail different policy and transactional characteristics than
transactions in goods or real estate.
What we will need in business practice and in law is a template
about how to handle the new assets and intangible products commer-
cially. That template must deal with licensing as a form of commercial
practice. This article provides the outlines of that template. It also
overviews the present state of the law on license transactions, includ-
ing the influence on that law resulting from the debates about and
enactment of UCITA. The article focuses on licensing of computer
information.' A license is a contract; it allocates rights in intangibles
such as software, databases, and other forms of information. While a
vast common law exists with respect to licensing, that common law is
unorganized and inconsistent. One effort to draw together common
law, commercial practice, and the unique nature of licensing into a
uniform contract law code exists in the Uniform Computer Informa-
tion Transactions Act (UCITA), a contract law statute modeled in
* This is an edited version of the transcript from the first panel at the DEPAUL BUSINESS AND
COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL SYMPOSIUM, Emerging Trends in Commercial Law: Surviving
Tomorrow's Challenges, held on April 15, 2004.
1. The term "computer information" comes from the Uniform Computer Information Trans-
actions Act (UCITA). Section 102(a)(10) defines computer information in relevant part as: "in-
formation in electronic form which is obtained from or through the use of a computer or which is
in a form capable of being processed by a computer." UCITA § 102(a)(10) (2000 Official Text).
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part after U.C.C. Article 2.2 UCITA has been enacted in two states,
but it has become mired in the conflict between proponents of the
new economy and its new transactional arrangements on the one
hand, and advocates of retaining previously vested positions or of re-
ducing the protection for information assets on the other. The tem-
plate set out in UCITA, however, will continue to be influential over
the next decades; it has already being used by courts, commentators
and by legislatures even outside of the states in which it has been en-
acted. It is a relevant reference point for anyone working in this field.
This article examines licensing in modern commerce. In Part 1, I
discuss the context and the function of licensing agreements, touching
also on some the legal issues these present that distinguish a license-
based economy from one based on sales or lease of tangibles. There
are fundamental differences between contracts that concern goods or
other tangibles and contracts whose subject matter is informational
assets such as software. Intangibles contracts are often licenses. Li-
censing invites and enables greater flexibility in allocating rights than
a sale of goods, and also is inherently a transaction in which the trans-
feror grants contractual rights or permissions, but retains predominant
ownership and control of the information itself. The concept of split
rights, which is also present in leasing of goods, is brought into play in
a much more vivid manner in licensing information. That fact leads to
very different commercial considerations for the parties to a license,
as well as for the persons who do business with those parties.
Part 2 shifts to a discussion of several specific issues of law associ-
ated with licensing. We look at these in part through the prism of
UCITA provisions and as a reflection of the current status of UCITA.
What emerges is a picture of a uniform law that has already done
much to coalesce the discussion about the role of contracts dealing
with digital information and that will continue to do so. The types of
issues that are controversial or complex in reference to licensing com-
puter information are different from those associated with transac-
tions in ordinary goods. Included, for example, are questions about
the transferability of rights under the license contract, the absence of
bona fide purchaser protections, the enforceability of electronic limi-
tations on the use of the licensed subject matter, and the ability of a
license to prevent reverse engineering of licensed subject matter. In
addition, computer information transactions have presented unique is-
sues about contract formation. Part 2 thus provides portions of an
2. Especially for transactions involving computer programs, of slightly more than 100 sections
in UCITA, over 70% are directly traceable to Article 2 doctrines.
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emerging law, related to but separate from UCITA, that governs li-
cense transactions and that pertains to persons who deal with licensors
and licensee of information.
PART I.
CONTEXT, FUNCTION AND THRESHOLD ISSUES
The computer and digital information industries are a vibrant, com-
petitive and growing sector of the economy.3 Indeed, we live in a
world in which availability of information, digital functionality, and
innovation has reached astounding heights and vibrant diversity. This
world is supported, at least in part, by an expanding use of licensing as
a form of commercial transaction. Predictably, licensing, which is to-
day already grown to comprise a significant portion of mass-market
and pure commercial commerce, will continue to grow in importance
in commerce and commercial practice.
Yet, amid the burgeoning diversity of available information and
computer-driven innovation, there are some who argue that the intel-
lectual property rights and the transactional frameworks that support
the information industries should be narrowly constrained by
mandatory, limiting rules in order to prevent the threat of increasing
control and narrowing distribution or creation of information assets.4
These political activists, described by some as "rights-restrictors", 5 are
not the subject of this paper, but the anti-rights and anti-corporate
perspective they bring to public policy is an important part of the story
of current licensing law and of UCITA. Stated simply, they represent
one side of an acrimonious argument that emerges in any context
where an opportunity appears for the restrictive perspective to limit
property rights and transactional development of the information-
based industries in favor of an undefined populist model of shared and
freely distributed information. 6
3. See American Electronics Association and Nasdaq, Cybernation, The Importance of the
high-Technology Industry to the American Economy (1998); Department of Commerce, U.S. In-
dustry and Trade Outlook 24-28 (1998). See also Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development, The Economic and Social Impact of Electronic Commerce: Preliminary Findings
and Research Agenda 27 (1999).
4. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self Help, 13 Berkeley Techno.
L.J. 1089 (1998); Mark Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intellectual Property
Licensing, 87 Cal. L. Rev. 111 (1998). Compare David Friedman, In Defense of Private Order-
ing: Comments on Julie Cohen's "Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help," 13 Berkeley
Techno. L.J. 1151 (1998).
5. See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz & W.M. Treanor, Eldred and Lochner: Copyright Term Exten-
sion and Intellectual Property as Constitutional Property, 112 Yale LJ 2331 (2003).
6. Interestingly, however, one element of the "free information" portion of this debate, the
so-called open source or free software movement, in fact relies on strong rights asserted through
2004]
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Despite those who argue for rights-restriction, the past several de-
cades have witnessed an expansion in protected rights in intangible
assets. That expansion has not been random nor was it unpredictable.
It reflects two parallel considerations. The first is that new informa-
tion technologies and communications systems have altered the na-
ture of value in the economy; law responds to that change. Second,
these same technologies have altered the balance present in property-
rights laws for information assets in ways that threaten the incentive
to innovate, such as by increasing the threat of widespread and perfect
reproduction and dissemination of copyrighted works.7 Law in such
cases responds to the new reality by adjusting the balance to preserve
incentives to create intellectual works. 8
Yet, our focus is on transactions, not property rights. While prop-
erty rights play some role in shaping transactions, as in any other com-
mercial context, the central issue that determines when or whether a
transaction in an informational asset occurs and under what terms is
value - does the transferor offer sufficient value to justify a trans-
feree's willingness to promise in return? Is the transferee willing to
give value sufficient to induce the transferor to transfer its value?
Contracts are exchanges. Interceding between property rights and
other informational assets in the market are a variety of market fac-
tors and individual judgments about value and about the relevance of
the asset being offered. One important function of licensing is that it
represents a contractual framework that enables parties to tailor as-
sets to the market that may exist for them
aggressive license provisions in order to establish and maintain what this movement regards as
appropriate "openness" in its particular types of software. See, e.g., GNU, General Public Li-
cense, Preamble (2001) ("To protect your rights, we need to make restrictions that forbid anyone
to deny you these rights or to ask you to surrender the rights. These restrictions translate to
certain responsibilities for you if you distribute copies of the software, or if you modify it. ...
We protect your rights with two steps: (1) copyright the software, and (2) offer you this license
which gives you legal permission to copy, distribute and/or modify the software. Also, for each
author's protection and ours, we want to make certain that everyone understands that there is no
warranty for this free software. If the software is modified by someone else and passed on, we
want its recipients to know that what they have is not the original, so that any problems intro-
duced by others will not reflect on the original authors' reputations.").
7. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001), related history 284
F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002) (operator of high volume digital file trading system liable for contribu-
tory and vicarious copyright infringement).
8. See In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003) (peer-to-peer system
provider liable for indirect infringement; court sets out a cost-benefit balancing approach to
determine duty to act and risk of contributory liability); U.S. v. Slater, 2003 WL 22519692, --
F3d - (7th Cir. 2003) ("It is preposterous to think that Internet piracy is authorized by virtue of
the fair use doctrine.").
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WHAT IS A LICENSE?
A license is a contract whose subject matter is information and
rights in information. The agreement contains agreed permissions or
restrictions that pertain to the licensee's use information, as well as
express or implicit promises by the licensee to not exceed contractual
limits. License agreements, of course, also often cover issues beyond
the right to use information, such as quality, availability, choice of law,
and the like. Unlike many transactions in goods, however, the core of
a software or other license does not center on qualitative warranties
or remedy limitations, although these may have significance. It fo-
cuses instead on delineating the scope of permitted use of the licensed
subject matter. Indeed, terms relating to scope are central to the en-
tire license transaction and define what "product" is being provided to
the licensee.
There is a fundamental dissonance in views of what is or should be
the fundamental nature of a commercial license of computer informa-
tion or other types of information. UCITA defines a "license" as a:
contract that authorizes access to, or use, distribution, performance,
modification, or reproduction of, information or informational
rights, but expressly limits the access or uses authorized or expressly
grants fewer than all rights in the information, whether or not the
transferee has title to a licensed copy. The term includes an access
contract9
UCITA goes on to define assumed consequences (default rules) in a
license of computer information and drawn from reported licensing
cases, modern practices, and policy judgments associated with existing
commercial and intellectual property law.
Does a license give an affirmative right to use information and as-
surances of its quality? The UCITA approach would often answer this
question in the affirmative. 10 In contrast, the view grounded in intel-
lectual property law treats a license as entailing few affirmative com-
mitments and NO assurance that the licensee can actually use the
subject matter without infringing another's rights. The following judi-
cial comment reflects this view:
[A] patent license ... is in essence nothing more than a promise by
the licensor not to sue the licensee .... Even if couched in terms of
"[L]icensee is given the right to make, use, or sell X," the agreement
cannot convey that absolute right because not even the patentee of
9. UCITA § 102(a)(41) (2000 Official Text).
10. See UCITA § 403; 404 (2000 Official Text).
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X is given that right. His right is merely one to exclude others from
making, using or selling X. 11
A similar concept applies to copyright licenses. 12
Two conflicting conceptions about the nature of a license thus ex-
ist.13 In one, there is no affirmative assurance to the licensee that it
can use the licensed subject matter. The license is a mere, non-trans-
ferable covenant not to sue.14 In the other, a licensee is presumed to
have a right to use the information unless that right or the presump-
tion is excluded by the agreement. These differing perspectives not
only shape the development of law in this field, but they also have an
impact on commercial practice. In formulating a license transaction
or in dealing with licensed subject matter as an asset, the parties need
to be clear whether they are dealing from the same basic understand-
ing of what is a license or, at least, that they recognize the different
views that might govern even though both are using the same word.
Similarly, there are conflicting perspectives on whether any implied
assurances of quality (warranty) exist in a license. Not surprisingly,
the traditional common law approach did not develop implied assur-
ances about the quality of the licensed subject matter. A doctrine of
caveat licensee prevails for patent, copyright, trademark, and trade se-
cret licenses. This reflects the reality that commercial licensing prac-
tice often does not in fact assume that qualitative assurances are
given. It also reflects a policy to avoid chilling distribution of informa-
tional assets by creating risks of liability.15 In contrast, images drawn
11. Spindelfabrik Suessen-Schurr v. Schubert & Salzer, 829 F.2d 1075, 1081 (Fed.Cir.1987),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1063 (1988).
12. Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 845 F.2d 851 (9th Cir 1988).
13. See Lorin Brennan, Why Article 2 Cannot Apply to Software Transactions, PLI Patents,
Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Property Course Handbook Series (Feb.- Mar.2001) (trend
in case law away from application of UCC to software and toward application of intellectual
property principles).
14. In re CFLC, Inc., 89 F.3d 673, 679, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1518, 1523 (9th Cir.1996). See In re
Catapult Entertainment, Inc., 165 F.3d 747 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. dismissed, 528 U.S. 924 (1999)
(Chapter 11 debtor in possession could not assume patent licenses over licensor's objection);
PPG Indus., Inc. v. Guardian Indus. Corp., 597 F.2d 1090 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 930
(1979); Unarco Indus., Inc. v. Kelley Co., 465 F.2d 1303, 1306 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 929 (1973); Gilson v. Republic of Ireland, 787 F.2d 655, 658 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. dismissed,
335 U.S. 855 (1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 892 (1948) ("It is well settled that a nonexclusive
licensee of a patent has only a personal and not a property interest in the patent and that this
personal right cannot be assigned unless the patent owner authorizes the assignment or the li-
cense itself permits assignment."); Stenograph Corp. v. Fulkerson, 972 F.2d 726, 729 n.2 (7th Cir.
1992) ("Patent licenses are not assignable in the absence of express language."). Compare In-
stitut Pasteur v. Cambridge Biotech Corp., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1503, 104 F.3d 489 (1st Cir. 1997)
(limited right to assume contract in Chapter 11 bankruptcy).
15. Warranty law differentiates between the paper or plastic and the information on it. The
paper or plastic may be subject to goods-based warranties, but the information is not. In this
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from a commercial goods context and incorporated into UCITA as to
computer programs assume the existence of disclaimable implied war-
ranties of merchantability (ordinary quality for the type of product
involved). 16
LICENSES AND RIGHTS TO USE
The main focus of a license centers on use of, or access to informa-
tion, along with a licensee's promise not to exceed agreed limita-
tions. 17 Although this is no longer true in many digital industries,
traditional licensing law dealt primarily with transactions that license
rights in intellectual property. Copyright and patent law, and to a
lesser extent trademark and trade secret law, conceive of property
rights in terms of preconditions which, if met with respect to particular
subject matter, yield defined property rights with respect to that sub-
ject matter. In copyright and patent law, these rights are described by
statute.
* Copyright: Property rights automatically attach to works of au-
thorship, and give the owner the exclusive right to make copies of
the work, distribute copies, make derivative works from it, pub-
licly perform the work, publicly display the work, and publicly
perform the work by means of a digital audio transmission.18
" Patent: Property rights attach to specific claims that pass stan-
dards of inventiveness and utility and result in the issuance of a
patent by federal authorities, and they include the right to prevent
others from making, using, selling or offering to sell the patented
invention. 19
One can license any of the rights, while retaining the others. Similarly,
one can subdivide the rights or condition the license on performance
of stated activities. These contractual choices are enforceable distribu-
country, we treat information as a creature of the First Amendment. See, e.g., Winter v. G.P.
Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1991); Cardozo v. True, 342 So.2d 1053 (Fla.
Dist.Ct.App.1977). On the applicability of the First Amendment to software, see, e.g., Junger v.
Daley, 209 F.3d 481 (6th Cir. 2000) (First Amendment limits permitted regulation of distribution
of computer source code); See also Universal Studios v. Corley, 273 F3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001)
(DMCA injunction valid; comments that remedies after Internet distribution would be futile);
DVD Copy Control Ass'n, v. Bunner, 75 P3d 1 (Cal. 2003).
16. See UCC §§ 2-314; 2A-212 (1998 Official Text). UCITA § 403 (2000 Official Text). The
UCITA section further indicates, however, that no implied "warranty is created under this sec-
tion with respect to informational content." This section was not changed or renumbered in the
2002 Amendments. See UCITA § 403 (2002 Official Text).
17. See Raymond T. Nimmer & Jeff Dodd, The Commercial Law of Licensing ch. 1 (Thom-
son-West, 2004).
18. 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 106. The last three of the listed rights are limited to particular types of
works, but that limitation has no relevance to this discussion. See generally Raymond T. Nim-
mer, Information Law ch. 4 (1996).
19. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101 et. seq. See generally Chisum on Patents.
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tion of the rights unless barred by competition law or other fundamen-
tal limiting policy.
A contract that grants one right (or a part of it) does not imply that
any other right has been granted. Indeed, many courts hold that a
license conveys only what was expressly granted or can reasonably be
inferred from that express grant.20 There is no assumption that a
transferor grants all rights except those it expressly withholds. In ef-
fect, the transactions are presumed to be limited conveyances, rather
than comprehensive transfers.
In commercial practice, there is wide diversity in how rights are
contractually arranged. The transactions are unlike transactions in
goods where agreements deal with particular items and entail exclu-
sive use, possession or ownership of that particular item. Information
transactions deal with assets that can be transferred and simultane-
ously retained by the transferor. The subject matter is not tangible and
limited, but intangible and available for recurrent transfers. In princi-
ple, an owner of a copyright or a patent can make an unlimited num-
ber of licenses of that work while retaining the information and
otherwise exclusive rights in it. The owner of a tangible product, on
the other hand, cannot both sell and retain ownership of it. Goods
transactions are bounded by the physical object, while transactions in
information are not.
This same difference affects issues when a third party deals with the
asset (e.g., purchasing it, financing based on it). Where the asset is
intangible, whether licensed or obtained in another type of transac-
tion, there is a likelihood of a split of rights being present. The third
party cannot reasonably rely on the other's possession of a copy of, or
knowledge about, the information as any indicia of ownership, a right
to transfer or, even, a right to use the information. Indeed, unless the
party developed the information itself, the opposite assumption may
often be more appropriate.
A distinction exists between exclusive and non-exclusive licenses.
The difference involves the terms of the contract and depends on
whether the licensor contractually commits not to grant further li-
censes of the same subject matter within the same scope as that given
to the licensee. If the licensor promises not to do so, the license is
exclusive. 21 In contrast, a non-exclusive license does not give the licen-
see rights against anyone else, but merely a permission to use within
the stated scope of the transaction.
20. See, e.g., SOS, Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1989). See also A&M Records,
Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
21. See UCITA § 307 (2000 Official Text).
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Sales of copies of software or of other information are more like
non-exclusive licenses than like exclusive licenses. The buyer of a copy
does NOT receive a commitment from the seller to refrain from selling
other copies to anyone else. More important, even if the buyer ac-
quires ownership of a copy in an unrestricted sale, under copyright,
patent or trademark law, it obtains only limited rights to use the infor-
mation and that copy; the copyright or other rights owner retains con-
trol of most uses of the information that relate to intellectual property
rights.22 A buyer of a book, for example, does not have the right to
make and distribute multiple copies of the novel.
In practice, selling copies of information works is merely one of
many transactional models that can be used. It entails a particular al-
location of contractual and underlying property rights. In intellectual
property law, these latter elements are defined in terms of "first sale"
(copyright and trademark law) or "exhaustion" (patent law) and in-
volve giving the buyer some ability to use its copy in ways that might
otherwise infringe the rights-owner's position. 23 For example, an
owner of a copy of a copyrighted work can resell that copy (distribute
it) without the copyright owner's position even though, ordinarily, the
copyright owner has the exclusive right to distribute the work in
copies.24
No law requires that copyright owners sell copies, but how one dis-
tinguishes between a sale and a license in a modern world has been
litigated.25 When a provider delivers a copy of information to a trans-
feree under terms that are substantially more restrictive than what a
buyer (owner) of a copy would receive, the better and clearly domi-
nant view is that the transferee does not become an owner of that
copy.26 UCITA summarizes the issue in simple terms: whether or not
ownership of a copy is transferred depends on the agreement.27 This
22. See, e.g., 17 USC §§ 109, 117.
23. See, e.g., 17 USC §§ 109, 117; Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir.
1992).
24. 17 USC § 109.
25. See discussion in Raymond T. Nimmer, The Law of Computer Technology §§ 1:96 - 1:100
(Thomson-West, 1996, 2004). See also Red Baron-Franklin Park, Inc. v. Taito Corp., 883 F.2d
275 (4th Cir. 1989) (does not give defense to exclusive right to publicly perform video game);
Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Redd Horne, Inc., 749 F.2d 154, 224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 641
(3d Cir. 1984).
26. See, e.g., DSC Communications Corp. v. Pulse Communications, Inc., 170 F.3d 1354 (Fed.
Cir. 1999); MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1458
(9th Cir. 1993), cert. dismissed, 510 U.S. 1033, 114 S. Ct. 671, 126 L. Ed. 2d 640 (1994). S.O.S.,
Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1087, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1241 (9th Cir. 1989); Mallinc-
krodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (By authorizing only a restricted
transfer, the patent owner and transferee are not governed by first sale concepts).
27. UCITA § 501 (2000 Official Text).
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is, after all, a contractual environment; a party has the right to decide
whether to sell copies or not, while the other party has a right to ac-
cept or reject the transaction being offered.
In commercial contexts, sale of a copy may or may not match what
the parties or the market in general desires. An authorized sale of a
copy primarily gives the owner (buyer) the right to redistribute that
copy to another person. 28 An unrestricted sale of a copy also gives the
buyer access to the information and the ability to use it in ways that
do not involve copying or otherwise infringing the copyright (or other
intellectual property right). If the copy sold is a copy of a "computer
program", there are limited additional rights to make a back up copy,
to copy the work into a computer, and to make modifications essential
to the copy owner's use.29 An authorized "sale" of a copy does NOT:
" Transfer the copyright or patent.
" Give the buyer a right to make and distribute multiple copies.
" Give the buyer the right to modify the work (except for limited
purposes involving a computer program).
" Give the buyer a right to publicly perform or display the work.
" Give the buyer the right to reconstruct/ make the patented item.
In contrast, a license by its nature allows parties to expand, subdivide
or exclude various rights in a tailored manner not achievable by an
unrestricted sale of a copy. One explanation for the increased use of
licensing in current commerce is that this tailoring fits the needs of the
modern market. It does, however, create an amazing array of
alternatives.
Licensing better allows the parties to convey and to purchase only
those rights that they desire without paying for more than they would
like. An early case enforcing a digital information license dealt with a
license for "consumer use" only.30 The licensor there made the identi-
cal digital product available under a different license allowing for un-
restricted use (including commercial), but at a much higher price. In
holding that the contract was enforceable, the court commented that
the licensing approach allowed the parties to price discriminate in an
efficient and affirmative manner. The consumer was not required to
pay for unwanted commercial use rights. In another case, a software
publisher distributed its software under a license for "educational use
28. 17 USC § 109.
29. 17 USC § 117.
30. ProCD Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). See also Storm Impact, Inc. v.




only" at a much lower price than it distributed the software under
licenses that did not restrict the type of use allowed. 31
Notably, within the limits of what rights it gives, an unrestricted sale
of a copy encompasses both consumer and commercial use rights, and
both educational and commercial uses. If a license is not used and we
assume that the publisher of the information will desire the same
overall income, the income will be averaged out over all copies sold
since each sale allows for all uses. As a result, consumers pay more
while commercial users pay less than under a licensing regime. A li-
cense establishes a basis to differentiate prices based on type of in-
tended use in a manner that clearly benefits consumers. Of course, the
publisher could offer two different tangible products. It could strip
out "commercial' features and offer the stripped down version to con-
sumers at a low price, and a full version at a higher price. That would
create a market differentiated by the actual functionality of the tangi-
ble copy, creating inefficiencies associated with managing product
production and distribution. It would also yield a result that is what
most consumers do not want.32
There are many situations in which the license expands the rights
received by a licensee beyond those made available by a sale. For
example, modern clip-art products typically grant a license for public
display of the images, a right not obtained by a first sale. Similarly, in
one case 33 the court enforced a shrinkwrap license of a document cre-
ation and viewing software where the license allowed making and dis-
tributing an unlimited number of copies of the viewer program. In
Storm Impact, Inc. v. Software of the Month Club34 the online license
for shareware allowed unlimited, non-commercial copying and distri-
bution. Microsoft Corp. v. DAK Indus.35 illustrates a very common
commercial use of licensing. In that case, Microsoft and DAK were
involved in an OEM distribution agreement. Rather than deliver
31. Adobe Systems Inc. v. One Stop Micro, Inc., 84 F. Supp2d 1086 (ND Cal. 2000) (distribu-
tion agreement was a license, rather than a sale conveying ownership). See also Adobe Sys., Inc.
v. Stargate Software, Inc., 2002 WL 192008 (ND Cal. 2002). Compare Softman Products Co.,
LLC v. Adobe Systems, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
32. July 2000 PC Magazine at 201 ("PC Magazine readers don't like watered-down software.
In our survey, respondents tend to prefer more advanced tools to simpler and less feature-rich
alternatives.").
33. Green Book Int'l Corp. v. Inunity Corp., 2 F. Supp. 112 (D. Mass. 1998).
34. Storm Impact, Inc. v. Software of the Month Club, 1998 WL 456572 (ND I11. 1998) (non-
commercial copying permitted); Test Equipment, Inc. v. Greenleaf Software, Inc., 10 F.Supp.2d
583 (W.D. Va. 1998) (mass market license allowed unlimited copying, but prohibited commercial
distribution).
35. Microsoft Corp. v. DAK Indus., 66 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 1995) (discussing and applying the
Microsoft master copy distribution license in a bankruptcy proceeding).
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thousands of copies of its software to DAK to be included in DAK
computers, Microsoft delivered a single, master copy, granting DAK a
license to make up to a designated number of copies and distribute
them as part of its computer systems. The transaction, based on a
license, clearly involved numerous efficiencies for both parties. In the
particular case, the court held that a minimum royalty payment re-
quired under the contract was in the form of a prepaid purchase of the
right to make the number of copies covered by the royalty payment.
DIVERSITY AND MANAGEMENT OF RIGHTS
The diverse contractual rights or permissions that can be imple-
mented by license agreements requires a different way of looking at
licensed assets than would ordinarily be the case with reference to
goods or real estate interests. Among the various effects, two have
the greatest significance in our context.
The first is that a person can obtain, or hold, entirely different rights
under entirely different limitations in assets that appear identical in
terms of physical manifestation. Possession of a copy by Party A tells
little or nothing about what rights Party A may have in reference to
the copy or to the information it contains. This is because of the signif-
icance of differing rights allocations and contractual limits established
with respect to the information.
Due to the variations that exist in practice, there is no simple equa-
tion that allows one to presume a certain characteristic package of
rights from the presence of a copy of software or other digital infor-
mation in the possession of a person. Indeed, both the Copyright Act
and UCITA expressly underscore the independence of possession or
transfer of a copy on the one hand, and transfer or control of informa-
tional property or contractual rights or limitations on the other.
UCITA states: "Transfer of a copy does not transfer ownership of in-
formational rights."'36 The Copyright Act states the same principle for
purposes of property law:
Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights under a
copyright, is distinct from ownership of any material object in which
the work is embodied. Transfer of ownership of any material object,
including the copy ... in which the work is first fixed, does not of
itself convey and rights in the copyrighted work embodied in the
object; nor, in the absence of an agreement, does transfer of owner-
ship of a copyright or of any exclusive rights under a copyright con-
vey property rights in any material object.37
36. UCITA § 501(b) (2000 Official Text).
37. 17 USC § 202.
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In this environment, when making a transaction, both the rights and
the objects involved should be specifically addressed, but in any event,
in dealing with informational assets, understanding the contractual
terms under which the individual came to be in possession of a copy or
knowledge of information may be a critical part of the due diligence
involved in understanding the asset itself.
The second point is related to the first: in dealing with informational
assets that involve intellectual property rights, there is an almost inevi-
table upstream tracing and rights issue except for those assets that are
developed by the person or that are freely made available to the pub-
lic with no restrictions. An example common in the software industry
illustrates the issue:
Example. Publisher A licenses Distributor to distribute copies of
A's copyrighted software, but only to persons who agree to an end
user license with Publisher A. The end user license allows a trans-
feree that takes in an authorized transaction and agrees to the li-
cense to make and use copies on up to three personal machines so
long as the copies are not used simultaneously by different people.
Modern case law routinely enforces shrinkwrap or click wrap licenses
like the end user license in this example, so I will put the contract
formation issue aside for the moment.38 If we look at the transactions
here, we see a copyright owner that has the exclusive right to make
and distribute copies of its software, but who granted permission to
Distributor to do so under specified conditions. If Distributor com-
plies with the conditions, it makes an authorized distribution. If not, it
breaches the contract and infringes the copyright. The end user's cir-
cumstances are directly affected by the nature of the distribution. An
unauthorized transfer gives no rights against the copyright (or patent)
owner. 39 Even in an authorized distribution, the end user's right to
copy the software into its machine depends on its license with the
38. See discussion at notes -- , infra. See also ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th
Cir. 1996) (contract enforceable; limits use of database to consumer purposes only); Hill vs.
Gateway 2000 Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997) (contract requiring arbitration enforceable
based on use of computer without objecting to contract terms); M.A. Mortenson Co., Inc. v.
Timberline Software Corp., 970 P.2d 803 (Wash. 2000); Greenfield v. Twin Vision Graphics, inc.,
268 F.Supp.2d 358 (D NJ 2003) (license for use of a photograph contained on invoice is enforce-
able; court rejects Wyse analysis); O'Quin v. Verizon Wireless, 256 F.Supp.2d 512 (MD La. 2003)
(Terms contained in telephone equipment box enforceable); 1-A Equipment Co. v. Icode, Inc.,
2003 Mass.App.Div. 30, 2003 WL 549913 (Mass. App. 2003) (licensee of software was bound by
end user agreement, which buyer accepted when installing the software); Adobe v. Stargate
Software, Inc., 2002 WL 1926008 (ND Cal. 2002); Adobe Sys. Inc. v. One Stop Micro, Inc., 84 F.
Supp. 2d 1086 (ND Cal. 2000) (licensee not an owner of the copy).
39. See Accusoft Corp. v. Mattel, Inc., 117 F.Supp.2d 99 (D. Mass. 2000) (no rights obtained
by merged entity where transfer of license not authorized).
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Publisher - nothing else in the distribution chain allows it to copy the
work.
In distribution chains such as this, the upstream parties do not relin-
quish all rights in even the copies that move into commerce. Indeed,
as we have seen, the upstream parties do not relinquish all rights even
if the copies are simply sold. As UCITA confirms: "Transfer of a copy
does not transfer ownership of informational rights."'40 Furthermore,
concepts of bona fide purchase typically do not apply to intellectual
property claims since, unlike a bona fide purchaser of ordinary goods,
even a person who acquires an informational asset contained on a tan-
gible copy can be under no illusion that it is acquiring all rights in the
information. 41
The presence of retained rights upstream leads to a final point in
this general discussion. This concerns the relationship between intel-
lectual property (or other property rights in information) and contract
law as enforcement tools in the event of breach.
As we have seen, a license can be formed with respect to informa-
tion regardless of whether the information is subject to any intellec-
tual property right. The key to forming a contract lies in the exchange
of value (consideration) and consideration can come from promises or
performance unrelated to property. Thus, my promise to give you fac-
tual information that is not subject to any property right creates a con-
tract when you promise in return to pay for my action and/or to limit
your use of the data in particular ways. Courts routinely enforce such
contracts. 42 The consideration you receive is my promise to provide
the data from me, something that I otherwise have no obligation to
do, while the consideration I receive lies in your promise to pay and to
limit your use of the data, things that, but for the contract, you would
not be required to do. Why would any person contractually agree to
limit its use and pay for information that could be obtained for free
from other sources? The answer depends on various factors (e.g., ease
of access, lack of time, reliability of the database, etc.). As the Sev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals commented when presented with the
question of whether a license could be enforced for information that
was neither patented nor copyrightable: "a contract is a contract, our
40. UCITA § 501(b) (2000 Official Text).
41. See Microsoft Corp. v. Harmony Computers & Electronics, Inc., 846 F. Supp. 208
(E.D.N.Y. 1994); Microsoft Corp. v. Grey Computer, 910 F. Supp. 1077 (D. Md. 1995). For a
parallel result in reference to patent licenses, see Rhone Poulenc Agro, S.A. v. DeKalb Genetics
Corp., 284 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
42. See ProCD Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996); Register.corn v. Verio, Inc.,
2004 WL 103400, -- F3d -- (2nd Cir. 2004); Lowry's Reports, Inc. v. Legg Mason, Inc., 271
F.Supp2d 737 (D Md. 2003) (contract claim re unprotected data enforced; no preemption).
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system of law assumes that contracts should be enforced in the ab-
sence of fraud, duress, criminality, unconscionability or similar
problems., 43
This being said, a contract that deals with information not protected
by intellectual property law involves a materially different type of re-
lationship than one in which patent, copyright, or other intellectual
property rights are involved. The reason is that a breach of a license
by exceeding the scope of the agreement or using the information af-
ter the license is cancelled can involve liability for both breach of con-
tract and infringement of the intellectual property right, while breach
of a contract where not property right is involved yields only a claim
for breach of contract. 44 The two legal regimes involve different re-
medial provisions based on different concepts and, depending on the
circumstances, either one might be the most advantageous for the ag-
grieved party.45
To see the point, consider Figure 1, which summarizes exclusive
rights held by a copyright owner:
FIGURE 1
Reproduce the work in copies -* No License - - Infringe
Distribute copies of the work - N License
Make derivative works - * No License - - Infringe
Publicly display the work - o No license - Infringe
Publicly perform the work p, No license .p Infringe
Figure 1 shows the result of a license to distribute copies of the work.
Now assume that, instead, a license grants Party B the right to use the
copyrighted work by making copies in Party B's network for use by
employees. The contract is that Party A (licensor) promises to not sue
B for the designated type of use, while Party B promises to not use the
software outside this scope and to pay whatever fees are required. If
B breaches by failing to pay, it is liable for damages in contract, but is
not infringing unless the breach results in the license being cancelled.
As long as the license continues to exist, it prevents infringement suit
43. ProCD Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
44. See Graham v. James, 144 F.3d 229, 236 (2d Cir. 1998); MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Com-
puter, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993); Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc., 320 F3d 1317
(Fed. Cir. 2003). This dual cause of action, of course, is limited by the basic principle that double
recovery is not allowed for the same wrong, but this will often not prevent recovery for both
breach of contract and infringement of a property right. See Kepner-Tregoe, Inc. v. Vroom, 186
F3d 283 (2d Cir. 1999); Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Metro Program Network, Inc., 962 F2d 775
(8th Cir. 1992). See Universal Gym Equipment, Inc. v. Erwa Exercise Equipment Ltd., 827 F2d
1542 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (patent and contract remedies are distinct).
45. See, e.g, Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 188 F3d 1115 (9th Cir. 1999) (distin-
guishing between a covenant breach and a breach of scope provisions).
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for actions taken within the scope of the license. On the other hand, if
Party B makes copies that it distributes to another company, it has
both breached the license contract and infringed the copyright. The
license in each case is a promise to not sue for conduct within its
scope, but does not otherwise protect infringing behavior. This rule
applies whether one adopts a restrictive view of licensing or a broader
commercial view.
This indicates the importance of scope provisions of a license: those
provisions set out the product being conveyed, but they also tend to
shape the availability of remedies. A corollary of the fact that acts
outside the scope of a license infringe and breach the license is that
the licensor can sue for either or both. It can, for example, leave the
license intact and sue for infringement if the conduct involved exceeds
the scope of the license grant.
The background rights are not always associated only with copy-
right law. As we focus on other types of rights-creating laws, the in-
teraction between contract and property rights becomes more
complex. For example, retaining the property right in a trade secret
given to another person requires a continuation of confidentiality re-
strictions that bind the other person.46 In a license, this often requires
contractual nondisclosure and related terms. If these are not ex-
pressly or implicitly present in the contract, the pre-existing property
right might be waived.
On the other hand, the background rights need not come from in-
tellectual property law. In Register.com v. Verio, Inc. , 47 for example, a
variety of property rights associated with unauthorized access to an
online site were violated. The case involved a company that accessed
an online database under circumstances in which the court held that
access and downloading of data was assent to an online contract. The
contract (license) terms limited use of the data. When the licensee
accessed the site knowing it would use the data for other purposes, the
court held that there was a breach of contract, but also violations of
trespass law, and, according to the lower court, criminal unauthorized
access to a computer and violation of federal communications law.
46. See, e.g., Raymond T. Nimmer, The Law of Computer Technology §§ 3:21 - 3:31 (Thom-
son-West, 1996, 2004); Raymond T. Nimmer, Information Law §§ 5:41 - 5:48 (1997, 2004).




UCITA, COMMON LAW AND EMERGING ISSUES
Current Law: UCITA and Common Law
At this point, we shift our focus from a general consideration of the
unique issues presented by license transactions and toward a more di-
rect consideration of aspects of licensing law today. With respect to
licenses of computer information (e.g., software, online, digital prod-
ucts), this inevitably requires that we pay attention to the current sta-
tus of UCITA and issues that the promulgation of UCITA
highlighted.
In most states, today, the contract law that pertains to licensing
transactions consists of a complex mix of state common law, UCC Ar-
ticle 2 in some cases, federal common law, and in some cases the terms
of federal intellectual property law statutes. 48 As we have seen, the
common law traditions applicable to licensing often differ radically
from common law traditions applicable to other types of contract.
Llewellyn once said: "One system of precedent' we may have, but it
works in forty different ways."'49 The common law pertaining to li-
censing is one of those forty or more different working models of
common law. It is a model that relatively few commercial law practi-
tioners or scholars are familiar with.
The Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA)
was promulgated 1999 by NCCUSL in an effort to bring some struc-
ture and clarity to this complex network of laws.50 It is a proposed
state-law codification of contract law related to computer information
transactions. 51 Writing about UCITA, a report published by the AEI-
48. See Raymond T. Nimmer, Through the Looking Glass: What Courts and UCITA have to
say About the Scope of Contract Law in the Information Age, 38 Dusquene L. Rev. - (2000);
Holly K. Towle, The Politics of Licensing Law, 36 Hous. L. Rev. 121 (1999); Raymond T. Nim-
mer, Images and Contract Law - What Law Applies to Transactions in Information, 36 Houston
L. Rev. 1 (1999);
49. Karl Llewellyn, On Philosophy in American Law, 82 U. PA. L. REv. 205, 205 n. 178
(1934). See generally Raymond T. Nimmer, Licensing in the Contemporary Information Econ-
omy, 8 Washington Univ. Jnl of Law & Policy. 99 (2002).
50. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, the primary drafting body
for the UCC and other similar uniform law proposals.
51. Note here that, even though copyright and patent law are federal property rights laws,
cases related to each field confirm that contract law issues are matters of state law unless the
property rights statute specifically preemptions. See, e.g., Graham v. James, 46 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1760,
1766 (2d Cir. 1998) (construction of license terms was matter of state law); Data Gen. Corp. v.
Grumman Sys. Corp., 36 F3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994); Jacob Maxwell, Inc. v. Veeck, 110 F.3d 749,
752-53 (11th Cir. 1997); Bloom v. Hearst Entertainment, Inc., 33 F.3d 518 (5th Cir. 1994) (book
publishing contract; court applied New York common law rules of contract interpretation, noting
that the burden was on the authors to reserve video rights to their book, if that was their intent);
Diggan v. Cycle Sat, Inc., 46 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1372, 1373-74 (Iowa 1998) (state law controls whether
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Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies described the purpose
of UCITA in the following terms:
The likely benefits [of adopting UCITA] include lower transaction
costs and improved contract interpretation .... By contrast, the po-
tential burdens associated with adopting UCITA appear to be mini-
mal. . . . Thus, while there is no practical way to quantify the
potential benefits and costs of UCITA, we conclude that economic
well-being would almost surely be enhanced by its adoption... The
argument for adoption is also buttressed by the lack of compelling
alternatives. If states do nothing, both producers and consumers will
be forced to cope with the uncertainties associated with ongoing in-
consistencies in state-level commercial contract law. If the states de-
velop their own regulations for computer information contracts, the
lack of uniformity will create burdens. Moreover, there is no good
reason to expect their design to be superior to UCITA.52
Promulgation of UCITA in 1999 culminated several years of intense
debate. During this debate and thereafter, UCITA was strongly sup-
ported by a large number of organizations, companies, bar groups,
and individuals and was opposed by a well-funded group of insurance
and other companies, organizations and individuals.
UCITA was conceived of, and largely emerged as a contract law
grounded in the grand tradition of United States contract law: pro-
moting and facilitating freedom of contract and the enforcement of
voluntary choices made in the marketplace. Much of the debate, how-
ever, had little to do with how UCITA approached this goal. The pri-
mary themes of opposition, instead, center on several parallel
arguments that ultimately contest the idea of market-driven choice in
this part of the economy.53 These themes are important for us here
because they define influences that are likely to produce future con-
troversy as licensing law evolves, although the most likely result is that
restrictive arguments will continue to be rejected in the face of a vi-
brant part of the economy. In summary, the parallel themes were:
compensation is owed for uses under implied license); Devlin v. Ingrum, 928 F2d 1084 (11th Cir.
1991); McCoy v. Mitsuboshi Cutlery, Inc., 67 F.3d 917, 920 (Fed.Cir.1995) ("Whether express or
implied, a license is a contract 'governed by ordinary principles of state contract law.").
52. Robert W. Hahn and Anne Layne-Farrar, An Economic Assessment of UCITA 2 (AEI-
Brookings, 2001). Another independent study by a research professional at the Progress & Free-
dom Foundation, concluded: "On balance, widespread adoption of UCITA would benefit con-
sumers, producers and the digital economy generally. It would enhance overall welfare by
reducing information and transactions costs in the exchange of informational goods and services,
as compared with the current legal regime." Kent Lassman, Contracts and Electronic Com-
merce: The Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA), Progress on Point (Peri-
odic papers published by the Progress & Freedom Foundation) p.10 (Release 10.1, January
2003).
53. Holly K. Towle, The Politics of Licensing Law, 36 Hous. L. Rev. 121 (1999).
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" Restricting rights: Essentially, the argument is that contracts
should be restrained in order to prevent excessive commercializa-
tion of intellectual property. Ultimately, this links directly to the
position of persons favoring restrictions of intellectual property
rights in all venues and, indeed, many who stated such restrictive
positions were the same people and organizations that make par-
allel arguments in other venues unrelated to contract law.54 The
position taken in UCITA is largely defined by a belief that con-
tract law should support commerce, that the feared abuses were
unproven, and that cases of abuse can be handled under antitrust,
intellectual property misuse, and traditional doctrines of uncon-
scionability and the like. 55
" Standard forms and consumer protection: Information commerce
often relies on standard form contracts, as do other all areas of
commerce, and also uses automated means of assent.56 Some per-
sons argue that standard forms should be constrained or elimi-
nated because they are not true contracts.57 A parallel issue
concerns the tension about increasing the modern level of con-
sumer protection. These arguments were applied to UCITA, sin-
gling out the information industry. The reality, however, is that
most standard form agreements (even if described as adhesion
contracts) are fully enforced today58 and that consumer protec-
54. SEE, E.G., Jessica Litman, The Tales that Article 2B Tells, 13 Berkeley Technology Law
Journal 931, 941 (1998); Mark Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intellectual
Property Licensing, 87 Cal. L. Rev. 111 (1998); Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudence
of Self-Help, 13 Berkeley Techno. L.J. 1089 (1998). Compare David Friedman, In Defense of
Private Ordering: Comments on Julie Cohen's "Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help,"
13 Berkeley Techno. L.J. 1151 (1998). One of the organizations that opposed UCITA was the
Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF). In another context, one writer commented about EFF
that, "[EFF] sees no grays at all. In any collision between IP and some other value, the other
value wins." James V. Delong, 'Defending Intellectual Property,' in Copy Fights 17, 19 (Adam
Thierer & Clyde Wayne Crews, 2002). See generally Paul M. Schwartz & W.M. Treanor, Eldred
and Lochner: Copyright Term Extension and Intellectual Property as Constitutional Property,
112 Yale U 2331 (2003).
55. UCITA, however, is a product of a political process and there are provisions that bow to
this rights-restrictor viewpoint, especially in some of the 2002 Amendments that, perhaps for this
reason, have never been adopted in any state. See. e.g., UCITA § 118 (2002 Official Text) (lim-
ited ban on enforcement of some "no reverse engineering" clauses in a license).
56. See discussion at notes -, infra. See also Raymond T. Nimmer, The Law of Computer
Technology ch. 7 (1997, 2004); Holly K. Towle, The Politics of Licensing Law, 36 Hous. L. Rev.
121 (1999); Gomulkiewicz and Williamson, A Brief Defense of Mass Market Software License
Agreements, 22 Rutgers Computer & Tech. L.J. 335 (1996).
57. See, e.g., Todd D. Rakoff, "Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 Harv.
L. Rev. 1173 (1983); W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of
Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529 (1971); Michael I. Meyerson, The Reunification of
Contract Law: The Objective Theory o Consumer Form Contracts, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1263,
1269-75 (1996).
58. See e.g., Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the
Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 429 (2002); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 211. See also
Klos v. Polske Linie Lotnicze, 133 F.3d 164 (2d Cir. 1998) ("The concept of adhesion contracts
introduces the serpent of uncertainty into the Eden of contract enforcement.... It may not be
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tion laws have generally been in federal or non-uniform state law.
The drafters of UCITA refused to single out the information in-
dustry for restrictive rules not applied elsewhere. As in Article 2,
UCITA takes the position that standard forms can form contracts
and that detailed consumer rules are best left to independent
state or federal action. Abuses can be monitored by unconsciona-
bility doctrine. UCITA, however, also lays out procedural protec-
tions requiring disclosure for contract formation in the mass-
market and elsewhere. 59
Place holders: Some companies and organizations, especially in
the insurance industry and the library community, take positions
that in effect seek to reverse the clock and to retain the leverage
and business patterns that existed before computer information
and licensing became a major part of the economy. UCITA takes
the position that markets will define and shape leverage and busi-
ness practice. This is not the business of contract law.
Despite opposition, UCITA was enacted by over-whelming votes in
two states (Virginia, Maryland) shortly after it was promulgated.
These are the only two states whose legislatures have closely ex-
amined UCITA.60 Thereafter, however, the opposition produced
deadlock, resulting in no further enactments over the past several
years. At the instigation of lobbyists, several states enacted statutes
that purport to preclude choice of law that includes UCITA even
though the legislatures in those states never reviewed the terms of
UCITA. In 2002, UCITA was amended in several specifics (the "2002
Amendments") to respond to some of the opposition. A number of
invoked to trump the clear language of the agreement unless there is a disturbing showing of
unfairness, undue oppression, or unconscionability."); Fireman's Fund Insurance v. M.V. DSR
Atlantic, 131 F.3d 1336 (9th Cir. 1998) (issue of adhesion contract not relevant where no ambigu-
ities in the contract); Dillard v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 961 F.2d 1148 (5th
Cir.1992) (adhesion contracts requiring arbitration of securities disputes are not unconscionable
as a matter of law); Riggs National Bank v. District of Columbia, 581 A.2d 1229, 1251 (D.C.
App. 1990) ("a contract may be one of adhesion, and is therefore subject to judicial scrutiny for
unconscionability. To establish unconscionability, however, the District must prove not only that
one of the parties lacked a meaningful choice but also that the terms of the contract are unrea-
sonably favorable to the other party"); American Bankers Mortgage Corp. v Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corp., 75 F.3d 1401 (9th Cir. 1996) (although contract may have been contract of
adhesion, it was fully enforceable in the absence of showing of unconscionability).
59. See UCITA §§ 112, 208, 209 (2000 Official Text). See e.g., Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 429 (2002)
("UCITA maintains the contextual, balanced approach to standard terms that can be found in
the paper world."). One interesting feature of the debate was that large insurance companies
that routinely used extensive and complex standard forms for their own contracts, we at the
forefront in arguing that standard forms should be curtailed or rendered unenforceable in the
information industries.
60. These states enacted the 2000 Official Text of UCITA. The 2000 Official Text can be
found at www.law.uh.edu/ucc2b/. The 2002 Official Text, which reflects some substantive and
numerous organizational revisions but has not been enacted, is available at www.nccusl.org. As
of January 1, 2005, further materials on UCITA will be available at www.licensing-contracts.org.
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former opponents withdrew opposition as a result, but others did not.
In 2003, NCCUSL removed UCITA from its priority enactment list,
placing it in the same position as most other uniform acts, available
and recommended for adoption by any state desiring to do so.
Viewed formally in terms of adoptions and opposition, the status of
UCITA is analogous to that of UCC Article 2 after it was promul-
gated in the 1950's, except that UCITA achieved enactment in impor-
tant states faster than Article 2. When Article 2 (on sales of goods)
was initially promulgated, it suffered over a decade of non-enactment
and generated passionate opposition. 61 That continued even after Ar-
ticle 2 had weathered a long hiatus and was revised. 62
Opposition and delay in implementing new ideas in a multistate po-
litical process is not surprising or even new. For example, the recently
completed project to revise Article 2 was completed after a gestation
period more than six years longer than for UCITA and equally contro-
versial. The controversy led earlier to discharging the original draft-
ing committee and resignation by the original reporters. The proposal
remains opposed by virtually all industry and consumer groups and
has not been enacted in any state.63
How is it that some controversial ideas, like Article 2 in the 1950's,
transform into accepted rules of law such that a proposal to change
them forty years later is passionately resisted? There is no single an-
swer, but the range of answers include that over time what appear to
61. Noting the controversy: Carrington, The Uniform Commercial Code-Sales, Bulk Sales
and Documents of Title, 15 Wyo. L.J. 1, 7 (1961); Hawkland, In re Articles 1, 2 and 6, 28 Temple
L.Q. 512, 513 (1955); Kripke, The Principles Underlying the Drafting of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, 1962 U. I11. L.F. 321, 324. Critical or at least questioning: Beutel, The Proposed Uni-
form (?) Commercial Code Should Not Be Adopted in Ohio, 14 OHIO ST. L.J. 3, 6-7 (1953)
(conspiracy between professors and successful lawyers); Buerger, The Sales Article of the Pro-
posed Uniform Commercial Code, 23 N.Y.S.B. Bull. 116, 120 (1951); Douglass, Discussion on
Sales as Proposed in the Uniform Commercial Code, 21 Okla. B.A.J. 808. 810 (1950); Goodwin,
How the Adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code Would Affect the Law of Sales in Oregon,
30 Ore. L. Rev. 212, 213-14 (1951); Ireton, The Commercial Code, 22 Miss. L.J. 273, 280 (1950);
King, Suggested Changes in the Uniform Commercial Code-Sales, 33 Ore. L. Rev. 113, 115-16
(1954); Levy, A Study of the Uniform Commercial Code-Sales, 58 Com. L.J. 329, 331 (1953).
62. See David W. Carroll, Harpooning Whales, of Which Karl N. Llewellyn is the Hero of the
piece; of Searching for More Expansion Joints in Karl's Crumbling Cathedral, 12 Boston College
Indus. & Comm. L. Rev. 139 (1970) ("Although it has been effective.., for only a few years, [it]
is being attacked with increasing frequency. Charges are made of bias against consumers and of
favoritism toward merchants, and angry rhetoric often erupts in classrooms from new law stu-
dents, highly sensitive to the injustice and business bias they perceive..."). See also Zipporah
B. Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the Merchant Rules, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 465
(1987).
63. See e.g., letters and other materials submitted to the American Law Institute in connec-
tion with its consideration at its May 12-14, 2003 meeting of the final draft. See "Motions and
Comments Submitted in Advance" at http://www.ali.org.
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be startling ideas become commonplace practice and as judicial rul-
ings adopt them, directly or indirectly. What once seemed new be-
comes somewhat old and comfortable.
So, if one measures the status of UCITA today in this context, what
are the results with respect to the ideas it outlines? They include the
following:
" Reports of "think tank" studies after promulgation of UCITA
conclude that enactment of UCITA would benefit commerce in
information.64
" Studies by contract law scholars conclude UCITA rules are con-
sistent with modern contract doctrine. 65
* Several casebooks on commercial law integrate coverage of
UCITA with that of Article 2 and Article 2A.66
" Some casebooks on contract law include coverage of UCITA.
" A treatise on electronic commerce extensively refers to UCITA.67
* Leading multi-volume treatises on commercial law cover
UCITA.68
Perhaps as important, however, are the evolving patterns in case
law and discussion of contract doctrine. Predictably, although UCITA
has been law in Maryland and Virginia for four years, there has been
no great upheaval in case law or commercial practice. Indeed, neither
state has produced a single reported decision on UCITA since its en-
actment. The mark of good contract law is that it produces little litiga-
tion. While the courts of these states have not yet been asked to
examine UCITA, other courts in other jurisdictions referred to
UCITA as a source of analysis. 69 In other cases terminology coined or
used in UCITA appears in cases even if mention is not made of
UCITA.70
64. See, e.g., Robert Hahn and Anne Layne-Farrar, "An Economic Assessment of UCITA,"
(AEI-Brookings 11/9/01) (" [We] conclude that economic well-being would almost surely be
enhanced by its adoption since the costs are likely to be small.").
65. See e.g., Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the
Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 429, 491 (2002) ("UCITA maintains the contextual, balanced
approach to standard terms that can be found in the paper world.").
66. See Richard Speidel & Linda Rusch, Commercial Transactions: Sales, Leases and Licenses
(West 2001); John Murray & Harry Flechtner, Sales, Leases and electronic Commerce (West
2003).
67. See, e.g., Raymond T. Nimmer & Holly K. Towle, The Law of Commercial Electronic
Transactions (Thomson/A.S. Pratt, 2003).
68. See Lawrence, Anderson on the Uniform Commercial Code (2002, 2003).
69. See e.g., Specht v. Netscape Communications Corporation, 306 F.3d 17 (2nd Cir. 2002);
Rhone Poulenc Agro, S.A. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 284 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2002); AGT
Intern., Inc. v. Level 3 Communications, LLC, 2002 WL 31409879 (S.D. Ohio 2002).
70. Examples would be the increasing references by courts to "opportunity to review" and
"manifestation of assent." Although the latter phrase is from the Restatement, until UCITA was
drafted, the phrase seemed little to appear in case law. Now it is ubiquitous, as is UCITA's
articulation of the requirements for a manifestation of assent. For example, UCITA requires
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Evolution of Modern Law: Sales of Goods, Licenses of information
One test of the status of a proposed law concerns how well its ideas
and themes mesh with emerging commercial practice and judicial doc-
trine. In the next few sections, we examine that issue with respect to
some of the core concepts in UCITA. In addition to shedding light on
the status of UCITA, this discussion provides an opportunity to see
where modern law and practice on these issues stand today. In effect,
the next few sections delineate the emerging legal template for licens-
ing on at least some significant issues.
The first question concerns what contract law applies.
Outside of UCITA states, transactions that involve licenses of infor-
mational assets are governed by a complex mix of contract laws. His-
torically, however, a number of courts applied Article 2 rules about
the sale of goods to transactions involving the license of digital
software, either directly or indirectly using a "predominant purpose
test" where the transaction also involves expensive computer hard-
ware.71 There are many reasons why this pattern developed, including
the simple fact that Article 2 sets out a body of codified law that is
easier to find and analyze than are the often messy and inconsistent
themes of common law.72
A premise of UCITA is that the law of sales does not suit the prac-
tice of licensing and that goods are much different than intangibles
and rights to use them. Indeed, as explained elsewhere, Llewellyn
originally conceived of and argued for Article 2 as a body of law tai-
lored to suit sales of goods.73 The important commercial field of com-
puter information licensing should not be force fit into the body of law
for the unrelated subject of the sale of goods. That view is imple-
mented in UCITA in its scope provisions that exclude most such sub-
that an act manifesting assent be taken when the person is acting with knowledge of the contract
sought to be formed. The failure to satisfy that requirement has caused modem online contracts
to fail. See e.g., Specht, supra,; Novak v. Overture Services Inc., 309 F.Supp.2d 446 (ED NY
2004); Rosenfeld v. Zemeck, 776 NYS2d 458, 2004 WL 963734 (NYSup. 2004).
71. See discussion in Raymond T. Nimmer, The Law of Computer Technology §§ 6:2 - 6:9
(West, 1997, 2004).
72. Interestingly, however, in a different context, courts are beginning to understand the de-
gree to which Article 2 as applied among the various states is non-uniform. Thus, for example,
the Texas Supreme Court has refused certification of a national class action based on alleged
breach of warranty, citing the diversity of rules that exist nationally on various questions associ-
ated with warranty liability. See Compaq Computer Corp. v. LaPray, 2004 WL 1048336 (Tex.
2004).
73. See generally Holly K. Towle, The Politics of Licensing Law, 36 Hous. L. Rev. 121 (1999).
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ject matter from Article 2, except for software embedded in and part
of ordinary goods other than computers. 74
How has that idea fared outside of enactment of UCITA? It is in-
creasingly being adopted.
Most of the decisions applying Article 2 to software occurred before
it became clear that software is separately important subject matter
with attributes far different from ordinary goods. Although some
courts continue to ignore this, others understand it and are signaling
the need for a different direction. For example, in a case involving
contract formation issues with respect to software downloaded from
an online site, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
commented:
Downloadable software, however, is scarcely a "tangible" good,
and, in part because software may be obtained, copied, or trans-
ferred effortlessly at the stroke of a computer key, licensing of such
Internet products has assumed a vast importance in recent years.
Recognizing that 'a body of law based on images of the sale of man-
ufactured goods ill fits licenses and other transactions in computer
information,' the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws has promulgated [UCITA], a code resembling
UCC Article 2 in many respects but drafted to reflect emergent
practices in the sale and licensing of computer information. 75
The court did not have to decide what law applied because it con-
cluded that, on the issue it addressed, Article 2, common law, and
UCITA produced identical analyses. Another court has commented
that until an alternative is enacted nationally, software transactions
occur in a "legislative void" of inappropriate law.76
Virtually all of the cases applying Article 2 involve issues about
warranty, cure, or the like and are based primarily on the fact that
common law does not provide clear guidance on these questions,
74. UCITA § 103 (2000 Official Text); Raymond T. Nimmer, Images and Contract Law -
What Law Applies to Transactions in Information, 36 Houston L. Rev. 1 (1999).
75. See e.g., Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 306 F3d 17, Note 13 (2d Cir.
2002)("Downloadable software, however, is scarcely a "tangible" good, and, in part because
software may be obtained, copied, or transferred effortlessly at the stroke of a computer key,
licensing of such Internet products has assumed a vast importance in recent years. Recognizing
that 'a body of law based on images of the sale of manufactured goods ill fits licenses and other
transactions in computer information,' the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws has promulgated the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act ("UCITA"),
a code resembling UCC Article 2 in many respects but drafted to reflect emergent practices in
the sale and licensing of computer information").
76. See I.Lan Systems, Inc. v. Netscout Service Level Corp., 183 F.Supp.2d 328 (D. Mass.
2002). See also Lorin Brennan, Why Article 2 Cannot Apply to Software Transactions, PLI Pat-
ents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Property Course Handbook Series (Feb.- Mar.2001)
(trend in case law away from application of UCC to software and toward application of intellec-
tual property principles).
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while Article 2 provides relatively familiar (after fifty years of applica-
tion) rules. Cases involving ownership of a copy,77 reverse engineer-
ing,78 transferability,7 9 use of electronic control devices,8 0 scope of a
license,' and the like routinely ignore Article 2 rules. But these are
often the most significant attributes of a licensing transaction. Simi-
larly, cases involving questions about the informational content also
routinely decline to apply Article 2 to issues related to that content.8 2
Although some would prefer to resist them, the ideas that digital
information is not equivalent to goods and that licenses are not
equivalent to sales are quite obvious ideas today, but they were con-
troversial when UCITA began its lengthy drafting process. Even
more important than the case law in reflecting this are developments
that build on UCITA in legislation. Article 9 of the UCC is the pri-
mary example.8 3 It was promulgated in the late 1990's and contains
definitions of goods and software that draw on UCITA, although they
slightly modify the UCITA concepts to fit the commercial context of
asset-based financing. It treats software as a different type of asset
than goods. Article 9 has been adopted in all fifty states and, thus,
represents a modern legislative statement of policy in those states that
software generally must be treated as separate from goods as an asset.
That legislative policy has already begun to influence court decisions
on the question of whether Article 2 should apply to this entirely dif-
ferent subject matter.8 4 It should not.
77. See, e.g., DSC Communications Corp. v. Pulse Communications, Inc., 170 F3d 1354 (Fed.
Cir. 1999).
78. See Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc., 320 F3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
79. See, e.g., In re CFLC, Inc., 89 F.3d 673, 679, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1518, 1523 (9th Cir.1996). See
In re Catapult Entertainment, Inc., 165 F.3d 747 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. dismissed, 528 U.S. 924
(1999) (Chapter 11 debtor in possession could not assume patent licenses over licensor's objec-
tion). Compare See Institut Pasteur v. Cambridge Biotech Corp., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1503, 104 F.3d
489 (1st Cir. 1997) (limited right to assume in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding where debtor
remains essentially the same entity).
80. See American Computer Trust Leasing v. Jack Farrell, 763 F.Supp. 1473 (D Minn. 1991).
81. See, e.g., SOS, Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F2d 1081, 1087 (9th Cir. 1989) ("The literal lan-
guage of the parties' contract provides that S.O.S. retains "all rights of ownership." This lan-
guage plainly encompasses not only copyright ownership, but also ownership of any copies of the
software."); Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 188 F3d 1115 (9th Cir. 1999) (distinguish-
ing between a covenant breach and a breach of scope provisions).
82. See, e.g., Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1991) (no product liability
for a book); Cardozo v. True, 342 So.2d 1053 (Fla. Dist.Ct.App.1977).
83. The overall impact of Article 9 on financing intellectual property, software and related
information assets is discussed elsewhere. See Raymond T. Nimmer, Information Law ch. 13
(Thomson-West 1997, 2004); Raymond T. Nimmer, Revised Article 9 and Intellectual Property
Asset Financing, 53 Maine L. Rev. 287 (2001) (reprinted in Intellectual Property Law Review,
2003).
84. See Page v. Hotchkiss, 2003 WL 22962151 (Conn. Super. 2003) ("In addition to the
software spectrum of cases, the court finds support for its findings from other chapters of the
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Under Article 9, software and computer programs are not goods,
but are intangibles ("general intangibles") 85 even if the program is on
a diskette or similar medium. The Article 9 concept derives from
UCITA. The only exception occurs when the program is embedded in
and customarily treated as part of ordinary goods.86 This also reflects
a concept suggested, albeit in different terms, in UCITA.
Four years after UCITA was promulgated, proposed revisions of
Article 2 were finally promulgated. The revisions state that "goods"
do not include "information." The Official Comments to the proposed
revisions of Article 2 explain that Article 2 would not apply to digital
copies, even though they are on a diskette. The information, not the
plastic, counts.
While the proposed revisions of Article 2 do not define "informa-
tion", the UCITA definition is relevant because it was the last defini-
tion of that term adopted by NCCUSL. It states:
"Information" means data, text, images, sounds, mask works, or
computer programs, including collections and compilations of
them.87
Similarly, the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA), which
has been adopted in over forty states, follows UCITA and provides:
""Information" means data, text, images, sounds, codes, computer
programs, software, databases, or the like. '88 In the federal Electronic
Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act (E-Sign),8 9 infor-
mation expressly includes computer programs: "The term 'informa-
tion' means data, text, images, sounds, codes, computer programs,
software, databases, or the like." 90 Dealing with the term "informa-
tion" in the federal Communications Decency Act, a court of appeals
has held that "information" includes a computer program. 9'
Here we can see the inevitable transition taking place and the clear
recognition of important differences in policy and in fact between or-
dinary goods and computer information assets, including software.
Few today truly believe that the plastic matters more than the pro-
General Statutes. First,... Article Nine of the UCC, defines "Goods" ... Applying the article
nine definition to the present case would again yield a finding that what Hotchkiss provided was
not goods since what was provided was a modified computer program embedded in a convenient
medium for Page to access. The real object of Page's purchase was the intellectual property
which had been loaded and stored on a transferable medium.").
85. UCC 9-102(a)(42), (75), (44) (2000 Official Text).
86. UCC § 9-102(a)(44) (2000 Official Text).
87. UCITA § 102(a)(35) (2000 Official Text).
88. UETA § 2(10) (1998 Official Text).
89. 15 USC §7001 et seq.
90. 15 USC § 7006(7).
91. See Green vs. American Online, 318 F.3d 465, 470 (2003).
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gram in the license of a computer program. As recognized in all fifty
states adopting Article 9, computer programs and other information
assets are intangible, not goods, and are properly treated as such. As
recognized in over forty states and federal law, computer programs
are defined as a type of "information."
Licenses and Contract Formation
As we have seen, one issue concerns whether licensing is a valid
form of transaction in the mass-market. The argument against such
transactions largely stems from a rights-restrictor perspective and ar-
gues, ultimately, that all digital products transferred in the mass mar-
ket involve sales of copies that are subject to so-called first sale rules.
UCITA adopts the ordinary principle that the difference between a
simple license and a simple sale of a copy lies in the agreement.92
Since the development of UCITA began, appellate courts and most
lower courts have routinely and consistently accepted that licensing is
an acceptable form of transaction. 93 It is broadly and consistently ac-
cepted today that a transferor can contractually condition and limit
the rights transferred in a transaction involving digital and other forms
of information assets. 94 It is not correct to say that UCITA caused
92. UCITA § 502(a) (2000 Official Text).
93. See, e.g., DSC Communications Corp. v. Pulse Communications, Inc., 170 F3d 1354 (Fed.
Cir. 1999); MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993) ("Since MAI
licensed its software, the Peak customers do not qualify as "owners" of the software and are not
eligible for protection under § 117."); SOS, Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F2d 1081, 1087 (9th Cir.
1989) ("The literal language of the parties' contract provides that S.O.S. retains "all rights of
ownership." This language plainly encompasses not only copyright ownership, but also owner-
ship of any copies of the software."); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996)
(contract enforceable; limits use of database to consumer purposes only); Hill vs. Gateway 2000
Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997) (contract requiring arbitration enforceable based on use of
computer without objecting to contract terms); M.A. Mortenson Co., Inc. v. Timberline Software
Corp., 970 P.2d 803 (Wash. 2000) (license enforced when it followed purchase order; "Reasona-
ble minds could not differ concerning a corporation's understanding that use of software is gov-
erned by licenses containing multiple terms.").
94. See, e.g., DSC Communications Corp. v. Pulse Communications, Inc., 170 F3d 1354 (Fed.
Cir. 1999); Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Monsanto Co. v
McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Arizona Cartridge Remanufacturers Ass'n, Inc. v.
Lexmark International, Inc., 290 F.Supp.2d 1034 (ND Cal. 2003) (No violation of state or other
law by imposing single use restriction; this transaction did not exhaust rights because it was
conditional); Compare the misguided analysis of the District Court in Softman Products Co.,
LLC v. Adobe Systems, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 45 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 945 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
The terms must, of course, be contractual or, at least, a part of the contractual relationship. See
Jazz Photo Corp. v. International Trade Commission, 264 F.3d 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2001), cert. denied,
536 U.S. 950 (2002); LG Electronics, Inc. v. Asustek Computer, Inc., 248 F.Supp.2d 912 (ND Cal.
2003) (Patent exhaust; first sale not barred by disclaim any authority re use of items sold; not a
contract condition).
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these appellate decisions, but it is fair to observe that the decisions
and UCITA are fully consistent.
This leads to the question of how one creates an enforceable con-
tract. The digital information industries have introduced new meth-
ods of contracting in the general marketplace and these have been
adopted in other industries. The core innovation involves bringing the
contract formation to the end user (licensee's) attention in an auto-
mated manner or through including proposed contract terms in the
package containing the informational or other subject matter. Assent
in such cases occurs through conduct or through indicating assent in
an automated, on-screen environment. In some cases, assent is re-
quired before anything is delivered or sent to the licensee, but in other
cases, there is preliminary agreement and then the contract terms are
presented in full later. This entails "layered contracting" in which par-
ties define the full terms of their contract over time and in layers,
rather than at one precise point in time.95 Often, the contract involves
a three-party transaction, like that described earlier, where the terms
of the license are part of an agreement between the end user and the
remote copyright owner, rather than between the end user and the
entity with whom it directly contracts.
This is not a context in which to fully explore the nuances of such
contracting. UCITA, however, provides simply that a person is bound
by terms of a contract if it agrees to them, including by manifesting
assent through voluntary words or conduct that he knows the other
person will treat as agreement.96 If the assent does not occur until
after an initial agreement, the assent is not enforceable unless the per-
son 1) had reason to know that terms would be presented later and 2)
had a right to say no and unwind the transaction with a refund of any
payment. The key terms in this framework are "manifestation of as-
sent", 97 which can be by conduct or otherwise but must be such as
would give reason to believe that the other party will infer assent from
the conduct, words or other action, and "opportunity to review",
which requires that the terms be presented in a way that would call
them to the attention of a reasonable person and that the assenting
95. See discussion in UCITA § 202, comment 4 (2000 Official Text). See also UCITA § 202,
comment 2 (2002 Official Text).
96. UCITA § 208 (2000 Official Text) (carried forward without change or renumbering into
2002 Official Text).




party have a chance to review the terms of the contract before as-
senting to it.98
The approach in UCITA is consistent with the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts, with the principles of original Article 2, which expressly
allow for flexibility in how and when contracts are formed, and with
modern commercial practice. The language and approach of UCITA
is well within the range of approaches that modern courts bring to this
question and, in fact, since promulgation of UCITA, the key terms
used in its framework appear in reported cases with increasing fre-
quency. Several years after UCITA was promulgated, Robert Hill-
man, a leading contract law scholar, and his coauthor commented:
"UCITA maintains the contextual, balanced approach to standard
terms that can be found in [cases in] the paper world." 99 The Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed with this view three years after
UCITA's promulgation, describing UCITA's approach as consistent
with common law and Article 2, and using it in part to examine what
type of notice is required to form contracts online.100 Interestingly, the
court's decision in this case was that no contract was formed because
the manner of presentation did not give the prospective licensee no-
tice that terms would be presented or that its conduct (downloading
the software) would constitute assent to terms. That result is consis-
tent with what would have been the result under UCITA in that case.
The contract formation principles set out in UCITA and in practice
have been vigorously challenged from both the perspective of persons
who desire to minimize the effectiveness of standard form contracts,
and from the perspective of persons interested in restricting the scope
of rights in reference to intellectual property assets. Despite this, the
pattern is, today, quite clear. If contract terms are presented in a
manner that would call attention to a reasonable person of their exis-
tence, gives an opportunity to review, and generates a manifestation
of assent, these contracts are enforceable. Courts today consistently
enforce shrinkwrap and clickwrap licenses. 10 1 They do so under stan-
98. UCITA § 112 (2000 Official Text), renumnbered without substantive change in Section
113 of the 2002 Official Text.
99. Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic
Age, 77 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 429, 491 (2002).
100. Specht v. Netscape Communications Corporation, 306 F.3d 17 (2nd Cir. 2002).
101. See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (contract enforceable;
limits use of database to consumer purposes only): Hill vs. Gateway 2000 Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th
Cir. 1997) (contract requiring arbitration enforceable based on use of computer without ob-
jecting to contract terms): M.A. Mortenson Co., Inc. v. Timberline Software Corp., 970 P.2d 803
(Wash. 2000) (license enforced when it followed purchase order: "Reasonable minds could not
differ concerning a corporation's understanding that use of software is governed by licenses con-
taining multiple terms."); Management Computer Controls, Inc. v. Charles Perry Const., Inc.,
20041
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dards that parallel those outlined in UCITA and often using language
that reflects UCITA provisions. Indeed, one recent court, in review-
ing a claim that an online license contract was unenforceable, com-
mented that it found essentially no authority at all for the proposition
that such licenses are not enforceable when properly presented.102
The contract in this case was held to be effective to limit the licensee's
use of data to non-commercial purposes.1o3
Assent can occur by conduct, which may, or may not involve click-
ing on an explicit assent button on a screen. The key standard, as
recognized in UCITA and the cases is that the person undertaking the
conduct have fair reason to know that the activity will indicate its as-
sent to contract terms to the other party. Thus, in Register.com v.
Verio, Inc.,' 0 4 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit visited the
issue of contract formation online and held that downloading, without
more, constituted assent where there were clear indications on the site
that this would be true. The court commented:
We recognize that contract offers on the Internet often require the
offeree to click on an "I agree" icon. And no doubt, in many cir-
cumstances, such a statement of agreement by the offeree is essen-
tial to the formation of a contract. But not in all circumstances.
While new commerce on the Internet has exposed courts to many
new situations, it has not fundamentally changed the principles of
contract. It is standard contract doctrine that when a benefit is of-
fered subject to stated conditions, and the offeree makes a decision
to take the benefit with knowledge of the terms of the offer, the
taking constitutes an acceptance of the terms, which accordingly be-
come binding on the offeree.... [The visitor to an apple stand] who
sees apples offered for 50 cents apiece and takes an apple, owes 50
743 So.2d 627 (Fla. App. 1999) (forum selection clause in shrink wrap license enforced); Rinaldi
v. Iomega Corp., 1999 WL 1442014 (Del. Super. 1999) (conspicuousness of disclaimer not af-
fected by fact it was delivered in shrink wrap format); Lieschke v. Realnetworks, Inc.,
2000 WL 198424 (ND Ill. 2000) (The court did not dwell on enforceability, but assumed it. The
license was displayed as a precondition to installing the software by the user who downloaded
the software.).
102. Siedle v. National Ass'n of Securities Dealers, Inc., 248 F.Supp.2d 1140 (MD Fla. 2003)
("There are any number of cases from other state and federal courts expressly and implicitly
approving the validity of click agreements. . . . In addition, although there may be no Florida
case law directly on point, the Plaintiffs were unable to cite the Court to any case law, Florida or
otherwise, holding a click agreement unenforceable or invalid."); Ticketmaster v. Tickets.com,
2003 WL 21406289, Lexsee 2003 US Dist Lexis 6483 (2003) (enforced without click assent).
103. Siedle v. National Ass'n of Securities Dealers, Inc., 248 F.Supp.2d 1140 (MD Fla. 2003)
(online contract can properly restrict use of data to non-commercial purposes); Costar Group,
Inc. v. Loopnet, inc., 164 F.Supp2d 688 (D Md 2001) (License agreement allowing brokers to use
service's photographs of properties for normal brokerage operations while prohibiting distribut-
ing database information via Internet, did not grant brokers license to post copyrighted photo-
graphs on rival Internet service's web site.).
104. Registercom v. Verio, Inc., 2004 WL 103400, -- F3d -- (2nd Cir. 2004).
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cents, regardless whether he did or did not say, "I agree." The
choice offered in such circumstances is to take the apple on the
known terms of the offer or not to take the apple. As we see it, the
defendant in Ticketmaster and Verio in this case had a similar
choice. Each was offered access to information subject to terms of
which they were well aware. Their choice was either to accept the
offer of contract, taking the information subject to the terms of the
offer, or, if the terms were not acceptable, to decline to take the
benefits.105
One could argue that such automated contracting and the practice
of layered contracting should be made illegal in order to further agen-
das associated with restricting commercial exploitation of information
assets or placing other restrictions on commerce, but the cases do not
support that outcome, nor does commercial practice. Instead, courts
uniformly find licenses to be enforceable under standards quite similar
to those codified in UCITA. The point is not simply that the result is
correct, but that the approach of UCITA flows smoothly along with
the existing and developing sense of appropriate law and practice, a
point that becomes apparent when one steps away from the conten-
tious world of legislative debate.
Other Selected Issues
This is not to say that UCITA is, or will become, part of the main-
stream or increasingly accepted law on all points. That may or may
not occur. Indeed, there are several issues where patterns are not yet
clear and on which UCITA takes a position that may or may not be-
come the norm. Let's take a brief look at several of these that have
commercial importance.
Transferability of a License
One context in which law applicable to licensing differs from law
applicable to other contracts concerns the transferability of a licen-
see's interest in a non-exclusive license. The source of the differences
lie not only in the conditional nature of the license relationship, but
also in the character of the subject matter of a license and the pres-
ence of federal policy overlays on contract law.
At general common law, if the contract is silent on transferability,
the contract can be assigned unless assignment delegates performance
that the other party has an interest in receiving from, or rendering to,
the particular original party. Assignability thus depends in part on the
105. Id at *9. See also Ticketmaster v. Tickets.com, 2003 WL 21406289, Lexsee 2003 US Dist
Lexis 6483 (2003) (click agreement is not required).
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law of nondelegable duties or personal services contracts. 10 6 A con-
tract can be assigned unless the assignment significantly impairs the
other party's interest in receiving performance from, or rendering it
to, the particular original party.10 7 Contract duties ordinarily cannot
be transferred without consent if the "contract shows that authority
has been conferred upon another because of personal confidence or
trust" and the performance of that contract hinges on the personal
skill and judgment of the licensee. 10 8 Under these rules, many licenses
are non-transferable. 10 9
When the contract is a non-exclusive license of an intellectual prop-
erty right, however, a different pattern of law exists. Stated simply,
the rule is that, as a matter of federal common law, non-exclusive
licensees cannot transfer their rights under a license without the con-
sent of the licensor. 110 The theory for this rule originated with the pro-
position that a nonexclusive license is merely a promise to not sue the
other party (the licensee). That promise is personal in nature and can-
not be transferred without consent. Speaking with reference to a pat-
ent license, however, the Ninth Circuit provided an additional
explanation:1 '
The fundamental policy of the patent system is to encourage the
creation and disclosure of new, useful, and non-obvious advances in
technology and design by granting the inventor the reward of the
106. See In re Pioneer Ford Sales, 729 F.2d 27, 469-470 (1984). See also In re Rooster, inc., 100
B.R. 228 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989) (Pennsylvania law).
107. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 317, 318.
108. In re Pioneer Ford Sales, 729 F.2d 27, 469-470 (1984). See also In re Rooster, 100 BR 228
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989) (Pennsylvania law).
109. See Sally Beauty Co., Inc. v. Nexxus Prod. Co., Inc., 801 F.2d 1001 (7th Cir. 1986) (UCC
2-210 bars assignment of duties in exclusive distributorship).
110. See In re CFLC, Inc., 89 F.3d 673, 679, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1518, 1523 (9th Cir.1996); Hil-
graeve Corp. v. Symantec Corp., 265 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("licenses are considered as
nothing more than a promise by the licensor not to sue the licensee. The covenant not to sue in
paragraph 2.2 does not grant a transferable license to the patent."); Unarco Indus., Inc. v. Kelley
Co., Inc., 465 F.2d 1303, 1306, 175 U.S.P.Q. 199, 201 (7th Cir.1972) ("question of assignability of
a patent license is a specific policy of federal patent law dealing with federal patent law "), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 929, 93 S.Ct. 1365, 35 L.Ed.2d 590 (1973); Harris v. Emus Records Corp., 734
F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1984) (copyright); In re Alltech Plastics, Inc., 71 BR 686 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn.
1987); In re Catapult Entertainment, Inc., 165 F.3d 747 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. dismissed, 528 U.S.
924 (1999) (Chapter 11 debtor in possession could not assume patent licenses over licensor's
objection); PPG Indus., Inc. v. Guardian Indus. Corp., 597 F.2d 1090 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 930 (1979); Gilson v. Republic of Ireland, 787 F.2d 655, 658 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. dismissed,
335 U.S. 855 (1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 892 (1948) ("It is well settled that a nonexclusive
licensee of a patent has only a personal and not a property interest in the patent and that this
personal right cannot be assigned unless the patent owner authorizes the assignment or the li-
cense itself permits assignment."); Stenograph Corp. v. Fulkerson, 972 F.2d 726, 729 n.2 (7th Cir.
1992) ("Patent licenses are not assignable in the absence of express language.").
111. In re CFLC, Inc., 89 F.3d 673, 679, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1518, 1523 (9th Cir.1996).
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exclusive right to practice the invention for a period of years. Al-
lowing . . . states to allow free assignability of nonexclusive patent
licenses would undermine the reward that encourages invention be-
cause a party seeking to use the patented invention could either
seek a license from the patent holder or seek an assignment of an
existing patent license from a licensee. In essence, every licensee
would become a potential competitor with the licensor-patent
holder in the market for licenses under the patents. 112
In effect, presumptively restricting transferability reflects the unique
character of intellectual property: it is an asset that does not lose value
or condition from mere use. Because of this, allowing the licensee to
transfer rights under a license would allow the licensee to compete
with its licensor on exactly the same work or product that the licensor
offers. The policy against transferability may not apply if no transfer
occurs, but merely a change in ownership of the licensee company.113
The impact of the federal policy may be affected in some cases by
federal intellectual property law rules that the sale of a product or a
copy that conveys ownership of the copy gives the transferee the abil-
ity (under property law) to re-transfer that copy even though the right
to distribute copies is ordinarily an exclusive right to the copyright
owner.' 14 These rules, however, only apply if the licensee "owns" the
copy or machine. Ownership of the copy depends on the terms of the
agreement. 115 If the license places restrictions on the licensee's use of
the copy or product that are not consistent with ownership, then the
licensee does not qualify as an owner and the competing federal rules
associated with doctrines of first sale and patent exhaustion do not
apply.
UCITA embodies the common law rule allowing transferability, but
uses language from Article 2.116 Unless prohibited by other law or by
the terms of the contract itself, under UCITA contractual rights may
be transferred:
unless the transfer.., would materially change the duty of the other
party, materially increase the burden or risk imposed on the other
party, or materially impair the other party's property or its likeli-
hood or expectation of obtaining return performance.11 7
112. 89 F3d at 679.
113. See Institut Pasteur v. Cambridge Biotech Corp., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1503, 104 F.3d 489 (1st
Cir. 1997).
114. See 17 USC § 117.
115. See, e.g., DSC Communications Corp. v. Pulse Communications, Inc., 170 F.3d 1354
(Fed. Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 923 (1999); Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d
700 (Fed. Cir. 1992); MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993).
116. UCC § 2-210.
117. UCITA § 503(a).
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The standard of "material" change is not limited by common law ideas
that refer to personal services contracts. UCITA, however, also ex-
pressly acknowledges the over-riding federal rule and the policies that
underlie it, as well as the fact that, even without the over-riding fed-
eral rule, many non-exclusive licenses are non-transferable even at
common law. The material change standard bars non-consensual
transfer where the transfer might expose confidential or other sensi-
tive information to a third party without the other party's consent.
Article 9 and UCITA both provide that the right to receive pay-
ment can be assigned; this rule applies to royalty payments from li-
censes and other types of contractual payments. 118 Article 9 also
purports to allow the creation and perfection of a security interest in a
licensee's interest in a license, regardless of whether the licensee's in-
terest could be transferred under other law.119 Article 9 does not,
however, permit foreclosure or other transfer of the interest in the
face of a contract clause precluding transfer or a law that makes the
licensee's interest non-transferable. The lien is a passive lien - en-
forceable only against the proceeds of sale of the contract rights with
permission of the licensor. In both respects, Article 9 pursues the goal
of increasing the assets available for purposes of secured financing.
Of course, however, Article 9 is state law and therefore falls in the
event preemptive federal law rules apply. 120
A contract term precluding transfer of a parties' contractual interest
is enforceable. That result is especially clear in reference to non-ex-
clusive licenses of patents or copyrights in which an underlying as-
sumption is that assignment cannot occur without consent of the
licensor.1 21 The Restatement describes the general principle of enforce-
ability as being grounded in the idea that each party is free, if it
chooses, to designate with whom it is willing to deal. Although the
Restatement suggests that non-transferability clauses should be nar-
rowly, rather than expansively interpreted, it also confirms that for
contractual rights or duties, there is no general prohibition against re-
118. UCC § 9- 406(d) (assignability of licensor's right to payment).
119. UCC § 9- 408 (security interest in licensee rights).
120. One court has held that assignments of royalties under a copyright do not assign the
copyright and, thus, come under state law, rather than federal law relating to assignment of
rights in a copyright. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Hirsch, 104 F.3d 1163, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1373 (9th
Cir 1997) (assignment of royalties need not be recorded under Copyright Act provisions).
121. See Verson Corp. v. Verson Intern. Group PLC, 899 F.Supp. 358 (ND Ill.) (restriction




straints on alienation. 122 UCITA adopts the same common law
principle.12 3
If the license precludes transfer completely- or without the licensor's
express consent, an attempt to transfer the license should be viewed as
ineffective, rather than merely as a breach of contract. That result is
supported by the underlying doctrine that non-exclusive licenses are
non-transferable and by an equally strong common law premise that
parties can control the transferability of contracts. Treating the trans-
fer as ineffective with reference to the licensor is also consistent with
the general concept that no bona fide purchaser concept exists in ref-
erence to intellectual property rights. 124
Acts of the unauthorized transferee that use the licensed software
are unlicensed and may constitute infringement. That result does not
depend on issues about good faith or the like, but as with any infringe-
ment claim, liability arises simply because the uses are not authorized
and fall within the scope of the non-transferred intellectual property
rights.12 5 As a result, a break in the chain of authorization that occurs
upstream may nevertheless affect the later licensee. 126
In transactions in goods, a buyer in good faith takes free of preexist-
ing ownership claims even if the sale to it was not authorized. This
occurs primarily in situations in which the owner of the goods (or
other rights-holder in them) entrusts the goods to another in a setting
that creates the appearance of authority to transfer ownership. 127 No
similar concept exists in intellectual properly law. Instead, a trans-
feree receives no rights unless the transfer was authorized by the li-
censor or by the applicable property rights statute. A recent
expression of this was in Rhone-Poulenc Agro, SA v. DeKalb Genetics
122. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 322 91971).
123. UCITA § 503 (2000 Official Text).
124. AccuSoft Corp. v. Mattel, Inc., 117 F.Supp.2d 99 (D. Mass. 2000).
125. See, eg., Microsoft Corp. v. Compusource Distributors, Inc., 115 F.Supp.2d 800 (E.D.
Mich. 2000) (Reseller violated Copyright Act by sale of counterfeit products. "Although Com-
pusource has been registered in Microsoft's System Builder Program since April 8, 1997, Com-
pusource did not obtain the software and hardware at issue here from a Microsoft "Delivery
Service Partner." [The software was] obtained between March 1997 and March 1999 was ob-
tained from unauthorized (non-DSP) distributors.").
126. See Rhone Poulenc Agro, S.A. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 284 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2002),
cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2668 (2003) (no concept of a good faith purchaser of a license); Microsoft
Corp. v. Grey Computer, 910 F. Supp. 1077 (D. Md. 1995); Microsoft Corp. v. Harmony Com-
puters & Elecs., Inc., 846 F. Supp. 208 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
127. The good faith purchase concept, however, does not apply when the possessory interest
was transferred in the form of a lease. There, the buyer of the goods takes only the leasehold
interest held by its seller. UCC § 2A-305(2).
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Corp. ,128 where the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit referenc-
ing the UCITA discussion of this issue, denied bona fide purchaser
status to a sub-licensee. The court cited UCITA comments. 129 In-
deed, the defendant here failed to cite any cases in which the bona
fide purchaser rule was applied to the holder of a mere contract
right.1 30
Rhone-Poulenc dealt with a patent license, but the policies apply
equally to copyright and trademark licenses. The case did not, how-
ever, deal with a situation in which a first sale may have occurred to
the party who made the later transfer. A first sale creates a limited
form of bona fide purchase in that the buyer is not subject to some of
the rights-owner's rights with respect to the copy it buys. On the
other hand, the buyer obtains first sale rights only if the seller was
authorized to sell. This was underscored in Microsoft Corp. v. Har-
mony Computers & Electronics, Inc.,'3 where a district court granted
a preliminary injunction against a retailer that was selling Microsoft
products but could not demonstrate that it had obtained those prod-
ucts from a third party authorized to sell the products to it. The in-
fringement consisted of a distribution of the work in copies and,
absent an authorized distribution to the retailer, the mere fact that it
allegedly acted in the good faith belief that it had obtained the copies
through a first sale from an authorized party was not relevant. The
alleged first-sale buyer has the burden to prove a chain of title that
justifies the first-sale claim.
"No Reverse Engineering" Clauses
One recurring issue in software and related licensing involves the
extent to which a license agreement can bar the licensee from "reverse
engineering" the licensed subject matter. Reverse engineering con-
128. Rhone Poulenc Agro, S.A. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 284 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2002),
cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2668 (2003). The court distinguished its earlier holding in Heidelberg
Harris v. Loebach, 145 F.3d 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1998), rehearing denied (1998), a case involving
reliance on recorded ownership of a patent in the Patent Office, which record latter was re-
scinded by another court.
129. UCITA § 506, comment 3 (2001 Official Text).
130. On the other hand, the defendant Monsanto cited "statements from various treatises on
patent licensing for the proposition that a sublicense continues, even when the principal license
is terminated. But the statements address the situation where the original licensee is terminated
as a matter of contract law, e.g., for breach of contract. These treatises do not address the opera-
tion of the bona fide purchaser rule with respect to sublicenses and do not state or suggest that a
sublicense continues even when the principal license is rescinded because it has been obtained
by fraud." 284 F3d at 1332.
131. Microsoft Corp. v. Harmony Computers & Elecs., Inc., 846 F. Supp. 208 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
See also Microsoft Corp. v. Grey Computer, 910 F. Supp. 1077 (D. Md. 1995).
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sists of disassembling and otherwise closely examining a product in
order to discover information about the technology it entails.1 32 Typi-
cally, reverse engineering occurs in cases where the transferee has
bought the product and owns it. As a practice, it is especially signifi-
cant in reference to technology protected solely by trade secret law,
where it is treated as a proper means of discovering the secret infor-
mation. In such cases, the Supreme Court has suggested, the ability to
reverse engineer a product is an important part of the overall tradeoff
of rights established by federal intellectual property law.133
When the technology involved is copyrighted, however, the ability
to reverse engineering without violating property rights is less clear
because the process of reverse engineering may require making copies
of the work in order to inspect the copyrighted code. Cases arising
where the reverse engineer owns the product and makes intermediate
copies needed to reverse engineer it have held that such copies are
fair use if used solely for this purpose.134 The status as fair use is less
clear, where the person is not an owner, but merely a licensee or
lessee because, in such cases, both contractual terms and ownership
rights in another party bear against being able to take a product apart
and inspect it.135
Our concern has to do with contract terms, not fair use. On this
issue, there has been an ongoing dispute internationally about
whether policies that support reverse engineering should over-ride
contract enforcement. The policies that support reverse engineering
involve a desire to free up otherwise unprotected technology from se-
crecy protections in cases where a product revealing the technology is
placed into an open market without restrictions. Also, reverse engi-
neering can be seen as an important aspect of the ability of competing
software and other products to maintain interoperable systems.
Even though it eventually became part of the UCITA debates, the
debate reverse engineering, copyright and the enforceability of license
provisions began in the late 1970's in Europe. There, competing coali-
tions of large companies fought over the terms of the then-proposed
EU Software Directive. For our purposes, the primary dispute fo-
cused on protecting the ability of licensees and other lawful users of a
132. See generally Raymond T. Nimmer, The Law of Computer Technology §§ 3:22-3:27; 1:73
(Thomson-West, 1996, 2004).
133. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 US 191 (1989).
134. See, e.g., Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F3d 596 (9th Cir.
2000).
135. See, e.g., Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 64 F3d 1330 (9th Cir. 1995) (find-
ing fair use regarding owned product, but not with reference to licensed product). Compare DSC
Communications Corp. v. Pulse Communications, Inc., 170 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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program to examine its technology in cases where the examination
was necessary to attain information in order to establish interoper-
ability of systems, and where the information is not otherwise availa-
ble. The EU Directive eventually granted copyright protection to
software, but provided a narrow exception for reverse engineering
necessary to discover otherwise unavailable information required to
establish interoperability with the licensed software.136 The particular
provisions state:
Art. 6:
(1) The authorization of the rightholder shall not be required
where reproduction of the code and translation of its form...
are indispensable to obtain the information necessary to achieve
the interoperability of an independently created computer pro-
gram with other programs, provided that the following condi-
tions are met:
(a) these acts are performed by the licensee or by another per-
son having a right to use a copy of a program, or on their
behalf by a person authorized to do so;
(b) the information necessary to achieve interoperability has
not previously been readily available to the persons re-
ferred to in subparagraph (a); and
(c) these acts are confined to the parts of the original program
which are necessary to achieve interoperability.
(2) The provisions of paragraph 1 shall not permit the information
obtained through its application:
(a) to be used for goals other than to achieve the interoper-
ability of the independently created computer program;
(b) to be given to others, except when necessary for the inter-
operability of the independently created computer pro-
gram; or
(c) to be used for the development, production or marketing of
a computer program substantially similar in its expression,
or for any other act which infringes copyright. 137
Article 9 of the Directive goes on to invalidated license agreements to
the extent that they are inconsistent ("contrary") with this narrow
exception.138
The conditions of indispensability and of the information not previ-
ously being "readily available" are significant limitations on the scope
of the exemption stated in this language. Given the narrow scope of
the exemption, the intrusion on contract rights is very narrow. The
United States has no law invalidating license clauses even under these
136. Directive on Legal Protection of Computer Programs (Software Directive), OJ L. 122/42
(May 17, 1991).
137. Software Directive art. 5, 6.
138. Software Directive art. 9(1).
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limited conditions. When the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(DMCA) anti-circumvention provisions were negotiated in Congress,
reverse engineering exemptions from DMCA liability were enacted
after a battle between the same groups that had previously fought in
Europe (with some membership changes).139 The DMCA exemption,
however, does not abrogate contract terms.
Although UCITA did not contemplate dealing with the issue, the
conflicting parties forced consideration of the issue. The 2000 Official
text of UCITA that was enacted in Virginia and Maryland takes the
position that I believe is most appropriate for U.S. law. It provides
that a court may invalidate a contract term if it finds that the term
violates a fundamental public policy that clearly outweighs the interest
in enforcing contract terms.140 This language derives from language in
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. The Official Comments exten-
sively discuss the public interest in allowing reverse engineering in
some cases, but do not mandate this result. They state in relevant
part:
A term or contract that results from an agreement between com-
mercial parties should be presumed to be valid and a heavy burden
of proof should be imposed on the party seeking to escape the terms
of the agreement ... On the other hand, terms in a mass-market
license that prohibit persons from observing the visible operations
or visible characteristics of software and using the observations to
develop non-infringing commercial products, that prohibit quota-
tion of limited material for purposes of education or criticism, or
that preclude a non-profit library licensee from making an archival
(back-up) copy would ordinarily be invalid in the absence of a
showing of significant commercial need. Under the general principle
in subsection (b), courts also may look to federal copyright and pat-
ent laws for guidance on what types of limitations on the rights of
owners of information ordinarily seem appropriate, recognizing,
however, that private parties ordinarily have sound commercial rea-
sons for contracting for limitations on use and that enforcing private
ordering arrangements in itself reflects a fundamental public policy
enacted throughout the Uniform Commercial Code and common
law.... [Many] areas of public information policy are in flux and
subject to extensive debate. In several instances these debates are
conducted within the domain of copyright or patent laws, such as
whether copying a copyrighted work for purposes of reverse engi-
neering is an infringement. This Act does not address these issues
of national policy, but how they are resolved may be instructive to
courts in applying this subsection. A recent national statement of
policy on the relationship between reverse engineering, security
139. See 17 USC § 1201.
140. UCITA § 103 (b) (2000 Official Text).
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testing, and copyright in digital information can be found at 17
U.S.C. § 1201 (1999). . . . It recognizes a policy to not prohibit some
reverse engineering where it is needed to obtain interoperability of
computer programs .... 141
In effect, UCITA established a balancing test in which, when the bal-
ance clearly turns against enforcement of contract terms, a court is
entitled to invalidate a "no reverse engineering" clause.
This provision did not satisfy proponents of reverse engineering
who preferred the European solution; it certainly did not satisfy some
proponents of open source software who argued that all contract
terms limiting reverse engineering in all contexts should be invalid.
After several years of ongoing debate, the 2002 Amendments adopted
a rule that precludes clauses from barring reverse engineering in lim-
ited cases where the program is broadly distributed, the reverse engi-
neering would be fair use, and the reverse engineering is necessary to
obtain information for interoperability and no other purpose. The
model comes the EU Directive. In the United States, however, it has
not been enacted in any state and was deleted when Virginia adopted
other portions of the 2002 amendments. In my estimation, it is a polit-
ical compromise that failed and should not be adopted as state law.
Where does this leave United States law? The first case directly to
address the enforceability of "no reverse engineering" clauses in the
absence of claims of copyright misuse, is the decision of the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Bowers v. Baystate Technologies.142
The court held that a "no reverse engineering" clause in a shrinkwrap
license was neither preempted nor limited by copyright law or policy.
The contract terms are enforceable independent of intellectual prop-
erty policy or fair use considerations because the reflect a different
basis for the rights created - a contractual basis.
Electronic Restrictions
Digital technology enables control of the use of a digital product
through direct limitations contained in a distributed copy or through
remote access by the licensor to the product itself. The systems have
significance with reference to intellectual property infringement is-
sues, but they also have potential importance with reference to licens-
ing law.
141. UCITA § 105, comment 3 (2000 Official Text).
142. Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, 320 F3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003). See also Edelman v.




When development of UCITA initially began, there was virtually no
law dealing with electronic measures of this type. UCITA adopted a
two-part classification to address some of the contract law issues in-
volved. The classification distinguishes between technology measures
that that limit use of a computer information product consistent with
the terms of the agreement (described as "automatic restraints") 43,
and measures that enable the licensor to disable performance of the
computer information product (devices for "electronic self-help"). 144
Of these, the self-help rules were most controversial, and remain so
today.
"Automatic restraints" are code or other devices that restrict the
number of uses, number of users, or the like. The simple premise
adopted by UCITA is that such devices are not a breach of contract if
they operate in a manner consistent with the terms of the agreement,
e.g., the licensed scope. 145 In effect, when used in this manner, the
"restraint" prevents breach and ensures that performance remains
within the parameters of the license. Indeed, in such cases, they are a
highly efficient means of monitoring contract compliance without ju-
dicial intervention.
After this concept was set out in UCITA, Congress enacted Section
1201 of the DMCA providing sanctions against circumvention of de-
vices that control access to copyrighted works and against trafficking
in such circumvention devices. 146 These DMCA provisions have been
controversial, being attacked from a rights-restrictor perspective as a
restriction on copyright fair use and on the free speech interests of the
person that is prevented from circumventing the technology. 147 Of
course, the systems are intended to protect the speech interests of the
copyright owner by enabling distribution in a form that avoids or at
least reduces the immediate, widespread copying of the work and dis-
tribution over the Internet. Courts have upheld the DMCA against
143. UCITA § 605(a) (2000 Official Text) (""automatic restraint" means a program, code,
device, or similar electronic or physical limitation the intended purpose of which is to restrict use
of information.").
144. UCITA § 816 (2000 Official Text).
145. For a non-technological application of this, see Golden Voice Technology Training, LLC
v Rockwell Electronic Commerce Corp., 267 F.Supp.2d 1178 (MD Fla. 2003) (Software agree-
ment limited the number of prerecorded messages that could be accessed, but the licensee's use
exceeded that limitation. The court interpreted the term "access" in light of its plain meaning
and held that this violated the license and the underlying patent).
146. 17 USC § 1201.
147. See discussion in Adam Thierer and Clyde Wayne Crews, Jr., Copy Fights (Cato Insti-
tute, 2002);
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First Amendment and related challenges. 148 The purpose behind the
provisions was described by one court as enforcing the right of the
property owner to place a fence around its property and as a means of
implementing effective protection for copyrighted works in a digital
environment where rapid, perfect copying threatens to eliminate the
in fact the adequacy of protections ordinary under traditional copy-
right law. 149
This is not a context to engage the debate in reference to DMCA
circumvention rules since they focus on property protections, not con-
tract. However, there is a relationship that needs to be pointed out.
While DMCA does not refer to contract enforcement, cases that deal
with the enforcement of DMCA restrictions against purchasers of
works or products containing a DMCA restrictive device, routinely
refer to the terms of the contract to determine what are the rights to
enforce or to by-pass the restrictive device.150 This is a result of the
type of devices involved. If a copyright owner makes an unrestricted
sale of a copy, it could include a device that restricts modification or
further copying of the work, but could it include a device that termi-
nates access after five uses? The answer to the latter point is that this
would be outside its contractual rights (under UCITA or under gen-
eral contract law) and might even be treated as a deceptive practice. 151
For purposes of DMCA analysis, one might say that the nature of the
transaction (a sale) authorized unlimited access to the copy and that,
therefore, the circumvention was not without the authorization of the
rights owner. 152
148. See Universal Studios v. Corley, 60 USPQ2d 1953 (2d Cir. 2001) (DMCA injunction
against online distribution of circumvention code affirmed); United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203
F.Supp.2d 1111 (ND Cal. 2002) (DMCA does not violate First Amendment; software is speech);
Edelman v. N2H2, 263 F. Supp.2d 137 (D 2003) (In challenge to DMCA, no cognizable right
under law to reverse engineer software). On a related issue, see DVD Copy Control Ass'n, v.
Bunner, 75 P3d 1 (Cal.) 2003). See generally, Raymond T. Nimmer, DMCA and the First
Amendment, in Copyright and Free Speech (Jonathon Griffiths & Uma Suthersanen eds.,
forthcoming).
149. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 443, 444 (2d Cir. 2001).
150. See, e.g., Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 253 F.Supp.2d
943 (ED Ky 2003) (DMCA violation; plaintiff explicitly restricted the use of third-party toner
cartridge refills for customers opting to buy toner cartridges at a discount under a shrinkwrap
agreement).
151. See Keel v. BMG Entertainment, 2003 Copr.L.Dec. P 28,711, 2003 WL 22808378 (Cal.
App. 2003) (No first Amendment barrier to claim that failure to disclose copy limits on disks was
deceptive practice; 1st Amend does not protect deception).
152. See, e.g., Chamberlain v. Skylink Technologies, Inc. 2003 WL 22038638 (ND Ill, 2003)
(One ground for denial was that there was no circumvention of a technological measure without
the authority of the copyright owner because plaintiff had tacitly granted permission).
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Placed in a contractual environment and restricted to the parties to
the contract and the rights owner, DMCA merely implements in prop-
erty-rights law a practice that has always existed in information indus-
tries - the use of technology to augment contract restrictions. The
DMCA rules in that setting recognize what UCITA also acknowl-
edges - in a digital environment, technology does have a role in cabin-
ing in performance to match contractual terms.
In contrast to the rules on contractually based automatic restraints,
the self-help rules in UCITA and elsewhere have been highly contro-
versial. The difference here is that electronic self-help capacity allows
the licensor to shut down use of a computer information product be-
cause it believes that a breach of the license justifying this step has
occurred. From the perspective of some, electronic self-help is a po-
tentially valuable and efficient remedy, especially for small companies
licensing to large companies whose economic leverage may drag out
any judicial enforcement proceedings. On the other side, self-help
may create undue leverage for the licensor and risk of harm from
shutting down a system abruptly and without warning. UCITA was
initially criticized for not banning the remedy from the perspective of
these persons, mostly large corporations.
This is a substantive debate that is not likely to fade away, but is
also not likely to result in many actual uses of the remedy. The
promulgated draft of UCITA enacted in Virginia and Maryland con-
tains extensive procedural and substantive limitations that make elec-
tronic self-help illegal unless expressly agreed to in the contract and
preceded by lengthy notice. Under these rules, there have been no
reported instances of attempted electronic self-help in either of the
two UCITA states.
UCITA is the only statute that limits electronic self-help. Revisions
of Article 9, which occurred parallel to UCITA, declined to address
the issue, but do allow secured creditors to repose equipment by disa-
bling it in place, without notice to the debtor so long as there is no
breach of the peace. 153 This seemingly allows electronic self-help.
Similarly, both current Article 2A (on leases) and proposed revisions
of Article 2A allow self-help repossession in the event of breach by
the lessee so long as no breach of the peace occurs. 154
Subsequently, seeking political progress, the 2002 Amendments
provided for a flat ban on electronic self-help.
153. UCC § 9-609(a) (2000 Official Text).
154. UCC § 2A-525 (1998 Official Text).
2004]
666 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
The case law is limited. One case, for example, allowed electronic
self-help where the licensee was aware that the licensor had access to
its systems, even though there was no express agreement to this rem-
edy. 155 A later case disallowed self-help in the absence of contractual
permission, but this case was decided before enactment of the
DMCA.156
Whether the solutions that UCITA suggests on this issue become
the framework for law remains to be seen. In the interim, the current
situation is that licensees are exposed to risk of self-help without any
of the protective rights contained in UCITA, unless they negotiate for
those rights in their license.
Choice of Law
Choice of law issues involve two distinct questions. The first con-
cerns what state's law applies in the absence of a contractual choice of
law. The second involves under what circumstances courts will en-
force a contractual choice of law.
The first of these questions is simply beyond our capacity to address
here in any meaningful manner. Choice of law rules in this country
are chaotic, conflicting and oriented to a litigation, rather than trans-
actional setting.157 UCITA proposes to stabilize this, especially in an
online environment, by providing that 1) in an access contract, the
choice of law is the location of the licensor (a rule that parallels the
provisions of an EU Directive and allows online providers to focus on
compliance with a single state's law), and 2) in other cases involving
consumers who are to receive tangible copies of computer information
products, the choice of law is the state where delivery is to occur.158
Courts routinely enforce contractual choices of law.1 59 Indeed, the
Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law provides that a choice of law
provision in a contract is enforceable unless the choice would alter a
mandatory rule of the state whose law otherwise applies, and violate a
fundamental public policy of that state. 160 Most current, versions of
the UCC enforce a choice of law of a state with a reasonable relation-
155. See American Computer Trust Leasing v. Jack Farrell, 763 F.Supp. 1473 (D Minn. 1991).
156. See North Texas Preventive Imaging v. Eisenberg, 1996 WL 1359212 (CD Cal. 1996).
157. See William Richman & William Reynolds, Understanding Conflict of Laws 241 (2d ed.
1992).
158. UCITA § 109 (2002 Official Text) (carried forward with no substantive change from Sec-
tion 109 of the 2000 Official Text).
159. See discussion in Raymond T. Nimmer & Holly K. Towle, The Law of Commercial Elec-
tronic Transactions 8.12 (A.S. Pratt 2003, 2004); Raymond T. Nimmer, The Law of Computer
Technology §§ 7:85 - 7:88 (West, 1997, 2004).
160. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 188.
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ship to the transaction. UCITA adopts a rule that enforces the con-
tract choice unless it violates a fundamental public policy, is
unconscionable, or would alter a mandatory consumer protection
rule.161
Subsequent to promulgation of UCITA, revisions of Article 1 of the
UCC adopted the UCITA approach by eliminating the reasonable re-
lationship test and codifying the fundamental public policy rule. On
the other hand, the revisions include a complex rule that, in effect,
applies the consumer law of the consumer's domicile regardless of its
mandatory or non-mandatory nature, and changes the applicable law
whenever the consumer moves to a new location. 162 That rule has
been rejected in most of the few enactments of revised Article 1. It
ignores the guidance contained in the Restatement and in UCITA,
and ignores commercial reality.
Online Access Contracts
With the advent of the Internet, massive amounts of information
are provided through online access systems, many of which use a
framework under which contractual permission, described as an "ac-
cess contract," is required to enter and use the information
resources.t 63
The common distinguishing feature of an access relationship is that
a central element of the relationship consists of the grant by one party
of access to or use of electronic resources, systems, or locations that
would otherwise not be available because they are controlled or
owned by the access provider. UCITA defines an access contract in
the following terms: "'Access contract' means a contract to obtain by
electronic means access to, or information from, an information
processing system of another person, or the equivalent of such ac-
cess. ' 164 Federal law captures a similar concept in defining an "inter-
active service provider" for purposes of the Communications Decency
Act:
[A]ny information service, system, or access software provider that
provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a com-
puter server, including specifically a service or system that provides
161. UCITA § 109 (2002 Official Text) (carried forward with no substantive change from Sec-
tion 109 of the 2000 Official Text).
162. UCC § 1-301 (2001 Official Text).
163. The term, "access contract," comes from UCITA and is defined in the following manner:
""Access contract" means a contract to obtain by electronic means access to, or information
from, an information processing system of another person, or the equivalent of such access."
UCITA § 102(a)(1) (2000 Official Text).
164. UCITA § 102(a)(1) (1999 Official Text).
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access to the Internet and such systems operated or services offered
by libraries or educational institutions. 165
These definitions differ, but both focus on "access" as a variable.
Given that focus, access relationships include the contracts of Internet
service providers, web site operators, online database providers and
other similar access providers, such as online auction systems. The key
is that a right of access to the provider's system is a central part of the
agreement.
From their emergence, access contracts have been recognized as a
new way of distributing information which presents market and other
issues unique to their own circumstance. Thus, the United States Of-
fice of Technology Assessment commented:1 66
[E]iectronic dissemination - unlike printing - does not involve the
publication of copies. As a consequence, copyright ownership is
transformed from the right to reproduce a copyrighted work in cop-
ies for sale to the right to control access to the copyrighted work for
any reason. [When] copyright is applied to works that are electroni-
cally disseminated, the balance between the rights held by the pro-
prietor and those retained by the public is changed. 167
In these contracts, access, instead of or in addition to intellectual
property rights, forms the base for the contract (that is, what the licen-
sor offers and what the licensee decides to acquire). Analogies to print
publications and sales of printed copies provide little insight for this
context or for what, if any, legal restraints might be placed on provid-
ers of information in this format. This is a new method of distribution
with its own market characteristics.
Some access relationships are pure access contracts, whereas others
involve a more expansive service, information, or product involve-
ment by the provider. Regardless of that variation, the fact that access
to a controlled environment (web site, database, etc.) constitutes part
of the relationship reshapes the basis on which contracts and rights or
restrictions can be formed. The scope of copyright protection on the
Internet has been often debated, along with questions about the scope
of fair use in digital information products, but when the digital infor-
mation is presented online, copyright is only one of the bases on which
the information provider might assert rights. As described in a report
by the Copyright Office: "By contrast, fair use and other copyright
exceptions are not defenses to gaining unauthorized access to a copy-
165. Communications Decency Act, 47 USC § 230(f)(2).
166. Office of Technology Assessment, Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Electronics
and Information (Washington: GPO 1986).




righted work: Quoting a manuscript may be a fair use; breaking into a
desk drawer and stealing it is not."'168
The general obligations of an access provider differ depending on
what it makes available to its users. The point is simple. The access
relationship is a separable element of the contractual or other rela-
tionship of the parties; in many cases, the provider's obligations are
limited to providing access, while other parties have responsibility for
meeting further expectations that might result from, or be enabled by
the access. Where more is involved (e.g., access granted to a site at
which items or information is sold) the access arrangements are sepa-
rate, or at least separable, matters governed by their own standards as
to performance, jurisdiction, or the like unless the access agreement
expressly incorporates these separable arrangements. 169
Even as to the access relationship, the provider's obligations vary.
There is little case law on the basic relationship, but it is clear that,
even when one assumes that an access arrangement exists for a period
of time, the provider's obligations should be treated under standards
akin to a services contract that does not implicitly require perfect per-
formance. UCITA captures this in the following terms, which apply
unless the parties otherwise contract:
(a) [ACCESS OVER TIME.] If an access contract provides for access
over a period of time, the following rules apply:
(4) [AVAILABILITY OF ACCESS.] Access must be available:
(A) at times and in a manner conforming to the express
terms of the agreement; and
(B) to the extent not expressly stated in the agreement, at
times and in a manner reasonable for the particular
type of contract in light of the ordinary standards of
the business, trade, or industry.
(b) [EFFECT OF UNAVAILABILITY OF ACCESS.] In an access contract
that gives the licensee a right of access at times substantially of
its own choosing during agreed periods, an occasional failure to
have access available during those times is not a breach of con-
tract if it is:
168. DMCA Section 104 Report, at 12 (August 29, 2001) (copy available 2001 http://
www.loc.gov/copyright/reports/sec-104-report-vol-l.pdf) (emphasis added).
169. See, e.g., Evans v. Matlock, 2002 WL 31863294 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (eBay user agree-
ment requiring arbitration of disputes applied only to disputes between eBay and users of the
services and did not apply to dispute between two users); Bobholz v. Banaszak, 655 NW 2d 547
(Wisc. App. 2002) (express warranty issues regarding Internet sale); Metcalf v. Lawson,
148 NH 35, 802 A2d 1221 (NH 2002) (sale to New Hampshire resident over eBay did not allow
for jurisdiction in New Hampshire); Winfield Collection, Ltd. v. McCauley, 105 F. Supp. 2d 746
(ED Mich. 2000) (two sales made to Michigan residents through eBay were insufficient to find
that the defendant purposefully availed herself of the privileges and protections of the State of
Michigan).
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(1) consistent with ordinary standards of the business, trade, or
industry for the particular type of contract; or
(2) caused by:
(A) scheduled downtime;
(B) reasonable needs for maintenance;
(C) reasonable periods of failure of equipment, computer
programs, or communications; or
(D) events reasonably beyond the licensor's control, and
the licensor exercises such commercially reasonable ef-
forts as the circumstances require.170
To obtain a greater commitment the user of the service must obtain
express obligations for availability.
Vhat state contract law applies to an access contract?
UCITA specifically applies to "access contracts. ' 171 In other juris-
dictions, common law should govern, but some cases have held that
outsourcing contracts were governed by Article 2 when the provider
also developed software for the particular outsourcing contract. 172
Clearly, however, Article 2 should be irrelevant because it applies
only to transactions in goods and not to a contract regarding use of or
access to an online site or service. One is a goods contract and the
other is a contract for information, access, and/or services, and there
are policy reasons not to lump one with the other. By way of illustra-
tion, in Kaplan v. Cablevision of Pa., Inc.,173 the court faced the argu-
ment that a cable television provider was subject to implied
obligations of merchantability with respect to its service. The court
ultimately rejected that claim, emphasizing the services and intangible
focus of the relationship. It commented:
Although the audio and video signals which the Cable Companies
transmit move through the cable wires .... The signals . . . are not
fairly identified as movables before the contract is performed. The
Cable Companies do not sell a tangible .. .instead they supply a
continuous stream of audio and video signals .... The merely act as a
common carrier ....174
170. UCITA § 611 (1999 Official Text).
171. UCITA § 102(a)(1) (1999 Official Text).
172. See Colonial Life Ins. Co. of Am.v. Electronic Data Systems, Inc., 817 F. Supp. 235
(DNH 1993); Hospital Computer Sys., Inc. v. Staten Island Hospital, 788 F. Supp. 1351 (1992).
These cases did not involve online access contracts, however.
173. Kaplan v. Cablevision of Pa., Inc., 448 Pa. Super. 306, 671 A2d 716 (Pa. Super. 1996). See
also William B. Tanner Co., Inc. v. WIOO, Inc., 528 F.2d 262 (3d Cir. 1975) (license for vocal and
instrumental recordings to be used on the air not a "transaction in goods" within Article 2.);
Snyder v. ISC Alloys, Ltd., 772 F. Supp. 244 (W.D. Pa. 1991); Rosenstein v. Standard and Poor's
Corp., 636 N.E.2d 665 (IIl. App. Ct. 1993) (data license not goods).
174. Kaplan v. Cablevision of Pa., Inc., 671 A2d 716, 724 (Pa. Super. 1996). See also, Pearl
Investments, LLC v. Standard I/O, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 326 (D. Me. 2003). In Pearl, the court
was asked to determine whether a software developer made implied UCC warranties for the
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Courts need to tread carefully in this area because of the tendency
by some to fail to distinguish between goods and information 175 and
the historical tendency to use a predominant-purpose test, at least
when dealing with Article 2 goods and common law services. A pre-
dominant-purpose test does not work for access contracts. Under that
approach, there is danger that Article 2 will not apply to the sale of a
good when it ought to apply, and danger that Article 2 will be applied
to other subject matter when it should not be.176
The only test that will recognize the nuances involved when an ac-
cess contract involves a sale of goods is a gravamen of the action test,
that is, an "each to its own" test. UCITA, the only statute that has
considered these issues, requires expressly that, but courts should
reach the same result under a reasoned analysis of the circumstances.
The gravamen test and UCITA recognize that the reality and beauty
of the information age is that many disciplines are converging and law
cannot work well in that kind of environment unless nuances are
observed.
The point is that only a gravamen of the action approach will ad-
dress the convergence issues that are inherent in an access contract
involving access, information, goods, and services. Use of a predomi-
nant-purpose approach will simply recreate what both UCITA and
UCC Article 2 originally sought to avoid, a single intellectual bin for
all cases and patterns no matter their nuances.
contracted software. The court determined that no such warranties existed because the predomi-
nant thrust of the transactions was for services, not goods:
[T]he Law Court has not had occasion to consider whether a contract for the provision of
software primarily constitutes a good or a service. [Plaintiff software licensee] asserts that the
weight of authority favors treatment of software programs as goods for purposes of the UCC....
However, I agree with the Defendants.. .that the cases on which [plaintiff] relies are distinguish-
able .... [I]n the instant case, [the parties] agreed that Standard would create ATS software from
scratch (concept to realization) for which it would be paid on a time and materials basis.
I find cases more closely on point than Dharma, Unisys and RRX holding that, for purposes of
applicability of the UCC, development of a software system from scratch primarily constitutes a
service.
Id. at 353.
175. See, e.g., Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 306 F3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002) (citations
omitted) (court noted that some courts have applied UCC Article 2 to software on a diskette;
the discussion, however, signals the court's likely disagreement with such application: the court
characterized some of the courts applying Article 2 as doing so with "misgivings" and also noted
the "trend away from application of UCC provisions to software sales and licensing and toward
application of intellectual property principles").
176. See discussion in Raymond T. Nimmer & Holly K. Towle, The Law of Commercial Elec-
tronic Transactions J 8.01 (A.S. Pratt 2003, 2004).
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SUMMARY
This article has attempted to provide the outlines of a template for
understanding licensing as a commercial transaction and the present
state of the law that relates to such transactions, including the influ-
ence on that law that is being felt through the debates, enactment and
discussion of UCITA. I have not attempted to be comprehensive.
That task must be left for another venue and a much lengthier consid-
eration of the legal issues involved.177 Rather, I have attempted to
highlight some of the major points of contention and, more impor-
tantly, the various ways in which license agreements present unique
issues for persons involved in creating, litigating, or dealing with li-
cense relationships as third parties. The differences between licensing
of information and sales or leases of ordinary, tangible goods are im-
mense as well as subtle. They demand continuing attention to this
type of transaction as an ordinary part of commercial law and
practice.
Stimulated in part by the development of UCITA and in part by the
simple reality that appears to all of us on a daily basis, courts and
legislatures have begun to recognize the differences between transac-
tions in goods and transactions in information, including especially,
licenses of information assets, including software. That recognition is
present in UCITA, Article 9, revisions of Article 2, the enactment of
federal electronic signature law, and the promulgation of the UETA,
as well as in other legislation. While some courts continue to cling to
the use of goods law for limited issues associated with software trans-
actions, cases broadly and properly look elsewhere for guidance on
most issues related to licensing, and one of the sources they refer to is
UCITA. As the recognition of the differences between licensing and
goods law continues, UCITA will continue to play a role in shaping
how the law develops in this context. The future of UCITA in terms
of immediate enactments is not clear. It is clear, however, that the
terms of UCITA and the rationale that supports them will continue to
play an increasingly important role into the future. Much like original
Article 2 in the 1950's, the history of UCITA will not be finally written
for a number of years.
But even aside from UCITA, there are clear functional and legal
differences in the rights and obligations associated with an informa-
tion license that distinguish it from other types of transactions. It is to
understanding and applying those differences that the attention of
177. See, e.g., Raymond T. Nimmer & Holly K. Towle, The Law of Commercial Electronic
Transactions (A.S. Pratt 2003, 2004).
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courts and practitioners in commercial should and increasingly does
turn. Hopefully, this paper will help in some modest way in assisting
that focus.

